THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM AND
THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT:
REALITY OR MYTH?
A. SAMUEL ODDI*

This article examines the impact on Third World countries of their
membership in the internationalpatent system. Professor Oddi begins
by discussing the traditionalrationalefor the existence of a patent system. He concludes that although this rationale may have some validity
for developed countries, the rationale is not applicable to developing
countries. The institution of a patent system in a developing country
may confer significant social costs on that country; membership in the
internationalpatent system may exacerbatethose costs. For those countries that do belong to the internationalpatent system, Professor Oddi
suggests changes to ameliorate the costs they will bear.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The debate over whether a country should have a patent system has
probably been going on ever since someone had the ingenious idea that
the sovereign should grant exclusive rights, if only for a limited time, to
inventors as an incentive to invent.I There has been no clear victor in the
debate, and the patent system has prospered and waned with the cyclic
frequency that one would expect of any doctrinaire system.
In the most recent debate over whether the patent system results in
a net benefit or a net cost to a particular society, the general conclusion,
at least of certain economists, appears to be that if a developed industrialized country has a patent system there is insufficient evidence available to
recommend that the patent system be abolished; conversely, neither does
the available evidence suggest the adoption of a patent system if one does
not already exist.2 Such an irresolute conclusion may give us pause; after
*
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1. Although the first known patent statute, the Venetian Statute of 1474, was enacted by a
large majority (116 for to 10 against and 3 abstaining), all senators evidently were not convinced of
its merits. See Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT, OFF. Soc'y 166, 176 (1948)
(translated by F.D. Prager from Mandich, Le Privative Industriali Veneziane (1450-1550), 34
RIVOSTA Di D1RIro COMMERCIALE 511 (1936)).
2. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH
CONG., 2D SEss., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY No. 15 (Comm. Print
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all, the patent system has at least a five-hundred-year history and has
been embraced, presumably as sound public policy, by substantially all
the nations of the world-whatever their present stage of industrial
3
development.
It is more troubling, perhaps, that many of those studying the international patent system as it relates to developing countries have concluded that it is economically unsound for such countries to have a
patent system if an overwhelming majority of patents are granted to foreigners. 4 Nonetheless, despite the lukewarm endorsement of domestic
patent systems within developed countries and the general nonendorsement of participation by developing countries in the international patent
system, we appear to be in a period of patent ascendancy; this seems to be
so not only in developed countries, 5 but also in Third World countries,
1958) (F. Machlup auth.) [hereinafter Machlupl. Machlup's conclusion is quoted infra in text accompanying note 52. His conclusion has been reaffirmed in later studies. Peckham, Should the US.
Patent Laws be Abolished?, 11 J. CONTEMP. L. 389, 421 n.93 (1985); Turner, The Patent System and
Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 453-55 (1969); cf W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW 32 (1973) ("But given appropriate standards for invention.., there is good reason for
supporting the long-standing legislative judgment that a consumer-oriented reward system, granting
a patentee the temporary right to exclude others from free riding, is in the social interest because
resources are thereby better allocated."); Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977) ("[A] legal system which has trade secrecy and a patent system will
better serve the public welfare than a legal system with only trade secrecy."). For a conclusion
similar to Machlup's with respect to copyrights, see Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 322 (1970).
3. Baxter lists 172 countries that have enacted patent statutes. 2 3. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT
LAW AND PRACTICE xvii-xix (1987).
4. See, e.g., U. ANDERFELT, INTERNATIONAL PATENT-LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 137-39 (1971); E. PENRO:;E, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 110-17 (1951); Greer, The Case Against PatentSystems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 223 (1973); Grundmann, ForeignPatentMonopolies in Developing Countries: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 12 J. DEVT'L STUD. 186 (1976); Kronstein & Till, A Reevaluationof the International
Patent Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 766 (1947); Vaitsos, PatentsRevisited Their
Function in Developing Countries, 9 3. DEVT'L STUD. 71, 89-90 (1972); J. Katz, Patents, the Paris
Convention and Less Developed Countries, Discussion Paper No. 190, at 24-27 (Yale Univ. Economic Growth Center, Nov. 1973). Compare this view with those concluding that the international
patent system is advantageous to developing countries. See, eg., 3 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION § 1030 (1975);
Dale & Huntoon, A Cost-Benefit Study of the Domestic and InternationalPatentSystems, 11 IDEA:
THE PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 351 (1967); Kunz-Hallstein, The Revision
of the InternationalSystem of Patent Protection in the Interest of Developing Countries, 10 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 649 (1979); LalI, The Patent System and The Transfer of
Technology to Less-Developed Countries, 10 3. WORLD TRADE L. 1, 14 (1976). In this article any
reference to developing countries will be to those generally following a capitalistic market economy,
unless otherivise indicated.
5. The United States recently has expanded the scope of patent protection legislatively. Examples are the extension of the term of certain patents relating to human drugs, 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-157
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the extension of the scope of patent infringement to include supplying
components in or from the United States for an invention to be assembled outside of this country, 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) (Supp. III 1985) (overruling Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
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including those with centralized market systems. 6
We are also in an era of great imbalances in international trade. Of
7
special concern is the huge foreign trade deficit of the United States,
compared to the huge trade surpluses of some of our key allies-in particular Japan." Indeed, some newly emerging industrial nations, such as
the Republic of Korea, are showing large trade surpluses.9 These imbalances have increased pressure within the United States to adopt "protectionist" trade measures, contrary to our announced policy of "free
trade."' 0 In addition to the traditional form of import restrictions, such
(1972)). Further legislation has been proposed to protect United States process-patent owners
against competition from imported products made abroad by the patented process. See, eg., H.R.
380, 100th Cong., IstSess., 133 CONG. REc. H154 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987). At least five bills were
considered during the last session of Congress for extending the term of patents covering animal
drugs and agricultural and industrial chemicals. See 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.
793, at 442-43 (Aug. 21, 1986). See also infra note 10 for other proposed legislation. The Supreme
Court has also expanded protection. See, eg., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (computercontrolled process is patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (living human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter).
It is interesting to note that at least 10 other countries extend patent protection to microorganisms. See 2A J. BAXTER, supra note 3, app. at 2A-14 to 2A-21. Additionally, Ecuador, Iran,
Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe, all of which are developing countries,
extend patent protection to computer programs. Id. app. at 2A-2 to 2A-9.
6. E.g., Patent Law of the People's Republic of China of Mar. 12, 1984, reprintedand transin 27 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 673, at 530 (Mar. 29, 1984).
7. The United States had trade deficits of $144.34 billion in 1986, $122.15 billion in 1985,
$112.51 billion in 1984, $67.08 billion in 1983, $36.45 billion in 1982, and $27.97 billion in 1981.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1987 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 691.
8. Japan had trade surpluses of $92.65 billion in 1986, $55.99 billion in 1985, $44.26 billion in
1984, $31.46 billion in 1983, $18.08 billion in 1982, and $19.96 billion in 1981. Id. at 421. Canada
had trade surpluses of $7.72 billion in 1986, $12.62 billion in 1985, $16.59 billion in 1984, $14.88
billion in 1983, $14.96 billion in 1982, and $6.61 billion in 1981. Id. at 259. The Federal Republic of
Germany had trade surpluses of $53.63 billion in 1986, $28.82 billion in 1985, $22.02 billion in 1984,
$21.48 billion in 1983, $25.03 billion in 1982, and $16.46 billion in 1981. Id. at 347.
9. South Korea went from a trade deficit of $19 million in 1985-to an overall trade surplus of
$4.20 billion in 1986. Id. at 439. South Korea had a $7 billion surplus with respect to the United
States. Burgess, U.S. Protectionism Feared, Wash. Post, Feb. 8, 1987, at HI, col. 4.
10. This policy appears to have bipartisan support. In President Reagan's State of the Union
address on January 27, 1987, he announced the Administration's intention to promote "competitiveness" by introducing "legal and regulatory reforms and weapons to fight unfair trade practices."
President's State of the Union Address, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 59, 63 (Feb. 2, 1987). In a
message submitted to Congress the same day entitled "A Quest for Excellence," President Reagan
included under the heading "Better Protecting Intellectual Property" proposed statutory changes
that would:
Encourage patent owners to engage in newer and more novel ways to license their patents
by limiting the "patent misuse doctrine";
Raise protection for products resulting from patented processes to the same level as that
accorded such products by our major trading partners;
Amend the Clayton Antitrust Act to provide a more flexible standard of review for intellectual property licensing arrangements;
Restore the bargaining power of parties contracting to license technology by codifying and
clarifying the Supreme Court holding in Lear v. Adkins;
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as tarriffs or quotas, we are witnessing an evolving form of "technological
protectionism."'1 1 For example, the United States has recently taken legislative and diplomatic action to assure that technical innovations developed within the United States receive reciprocal patent protection in
other countries. 12 If a country fails to provide the same protection to
Eliminate the current injury requirement from section 337 Proceedings at the International
Trade Commission to exclude imports;
Restore the term of patents covering agricultural chemical products and animal drugs up
to a maximum of five years to account for the period lost due to mandatory federal
premarketing regulatory review and testing.
See President's Message to Congress: A Quest for Excellence, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 65,
69 (Feb. 2, 1987). On February 19, 1987, the Administration sent to Congress the "Trade, Employment, and Productivity Act of 1987," which includes as Title III the "Omnibus Intellectual Property
Rights Improvement Act of 1987." This Act would impose the "rule of reason standard" in antitrust actions involving technology licensing (§ 3102), permit exclusion of products made abroad by a
process patented in the United States (@3103), and require an antitrust violation for a finding of
patent misuse (§ 3105). See 52 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1303, at 348-49 (Feb. 19,
1987).
In the House, the Omnibus Trade Bi1,H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H3225
(daily ed. May 22, 1986), passed in 1986. The bill was reintroduced by Representative Gephardt as
H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H101 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) and passed on April
30, 1987, 133 CONG. REC. H2981 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987). This bill would amend section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), to make it easier for owners of
U.S. intellectual property to exclude foreign imports. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 172, 133
CONG. REC. H2898 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987). It would also require the U.S. Trade Representative to
identify those countries not providing adequate protection to U.S. intellectual property and to negotiate with those countries to secure such protection and market access to those countries. Id. § 173,
133 CoNG. REC. H2899 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1987).
In the Senate, Senator Bentsen introduced the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987, S.490, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S1851-59 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1987), which would incorporate S. 468, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Senator Lautenberg, 133 CONG. REC. S1795-97 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1987). The bill would amend section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, and also
provide for monitoring the transfer of technology between the United States and foreign countries
and the scope of intellectual property protection provided by foreign countries. See 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 817, at 340-41 (Feb. 12, 1987).
11. See Barton, Coping with TechnologicalProtectionism, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1984,
at 91 (Modem mercantilism protects nations' teehnological bases.) [hereinafter Barton 1984].
12. Current legislation includes the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. III 1985)). See also infra note 13.
Legislation was proposed in the 99th Congress, and is likely to be reintroduced, on providing protection for computer software only on a reciprocal basis. The International Computer Software Protection Act of 1985, S.339, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S883 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1985).
With respect to semiconductor chips, the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office
reported to Congress on November 7, 1986, that 16 countries were eligible for interim protection
authorized under section 914 of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, because (1) they
made good faith efforts toward providing reciprocal protection to U.S. nationals, (2) their nationals
were not misappropriating U.S.-protected works, and (3) such interim protection would promote
international comity. See 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 806, at 51-52 (Nov. 20,
1986).
Diplomatic efforts were also successful in securing agreement that the Republic of Korea would
amend its patent law to include protection for chemical and pharmaceutical products and their new
uses and for microorganisms. In addition, the Korean government agreed to extend increased pro-
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innovations as is provided in the United States, innovations originating in
that country will be denied protection in the United States. In addition,
trade sanctions could be imposed on products sought to be imported into
the United States from that country. 13 The general idea of such measures is to minimize copying of American innovations abroad and to improve the ability of American enterprises to compete in the international
14
market.
Most Third World countries find themselves facing the same type of
trade imbalance as the United States.1 5 They also find themselves
strapped by large debts, to the point of default, arising in considerable
measure from such trade imbalances. 16 This negative balance of trade is
tection for trademarks and copyrights. See Quigg, American Bar Association Address, 68 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 351, 372-74 (1986).
13. Legislation has been proposed to impose trade sanctions on countries that do not provide
adequate domestic protection of intellectual property rights originating in the United States or that
deny market access to United States enterprises relying on such rights. Anti-Piracy and Market
Access Act, S. 335, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S953-56 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987). It is
also likely that legislation corresponding to the Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Protection Act, S. 2663, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S9389-91 (daily ed. July 21, 1986), will
be introduced, which would impose trade sanctions on countries that condition access by United
States firms to the market of that country on the transfer of those firms' technology.
14. The political rhetoric is much stronger,-for example, Representative Dingell's remarks
before the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee:
[A]II the companies and workers of this country ask is a level playing field. Yet, with a few
exceptions, this Administration continues to turn the other cheek when country after counFirst, the intellectual property of our industry is
try targets industry after industry ....
stolen. Then our foreign markets are flooded with counterfeits.... Finally, our firms are
driven out of business, or close to it-and, all the while, their markets are insulated from
meaningful competition.
32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 799, at 609 (Oct. 2, 1986). In introducing the International Intellectual Property Protection and Market Access Act of 1986, S. 2435, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S5752-56 (daily ed. May 12, 1986), reintroducedas S. 335, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S953-56 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1987) (under the title "Anti-Piracy and Market
Access Act"), Senator Wilson remarked:
In the area of intellectual property protection, plainly stated, criminals around the world
are costing American companies billions of dollars by cranking out millions of unauthorized copies of U.S. records and tapes, movies, books, toys, computer programs, as well as
by expropriating patents and process patents, developed at great expense by U.S. companies, to make bootleg pharmaceuticals and chemicals.
What makes this illegal activity all the more outrageous is that it is often protected by
governments we consider friendly to the United States. Indeed, in many cases we have
provided special trade benefits in order to help them develop their economies.
132 CONG. REc. S5752 (daily ed. May 12, 1986).
15. See Appendix.
16. Id. The importance of a developing country's ability to generate a surplus in international
trade is dramatically illustrated by the decision of Brazil in February 1987 to suspend interest payments on its commercial loans of $67 billion out of its total debt of $107 billion. Troell & Cohen,
Brazil Debt Action Poses Challengefor Major Banks, Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 3, col. 4. This
decision appears to have been precipitated by a drop in Brazil's trade surplus to $129 million in
January 1987 from an average of $1 billion per month during the first three quarters of 1986. The
January figures were the lowest in four years. Langfur, Brazil May Halt Debt Payments, Chicago
Trib., Feb. 20, 1987, § 3, at 1, col. 2. The Economics Minister of Argentina has stated that the
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exacerbated by the higher prices for imported goods that are caused by
import monopolies enjoyed by foreign enterprises in the form of patents.
Participation in the international patent system by developing countries
suggests that these countries perceive, as a matter of public policy, and
contrary to the views of certain economists, that their participation will
lead to an increased level of economic development. This perception appears to be based on a fundamental assumption that there is a causal
relationship between a developing country's participation in the international patent system and its economic development.
This article addresses the validity of this assumption. First, the
traditional rationales and the cost/benefit analysis for patent systems in
developed countries are reviewed. 17 Next, the extent to which these rationales and the cost/benefit analysis may be extrapolated to developing
countries is considered. 18 This article then explores the legal and economic consequences of participation by developing countries in the legal
regime of the international patent system' 9 as primarily embodied in the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883.20
Based upon the foregoing analysis, this article makes a number of recommendations concerning the extent to which developing countries should
continue to participate in the international patent system. Finally, the
article gives an indication of the anticipated consequences of following
economic growth of Argentina will not be sacrificed to service its $50 billion foreign debt. Evans,
Argentina Freezes Wages and Prices, Devalues Currency 7% Against Dollar, Wall St. J., Feb. 26,
1987, at 27, col. 2. Other Latin American countries (including Venezuela and Chile) are also in the
process of trying to restructure their foreign loans. Truell, Venezuelan Pact Shows Viability ofNegotiations, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1987, at 23, col. 4.
17. See infra notes 22-54 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 55-103 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 104-46 and accompanying text.
20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883, 101 Parry's
T.S. 409. The original Convention has been revised six times: The Act of Brussels of December 14,
1900, 189 Parry's T.S. 134; The Act of Washington of June 2, 1911, 213 Parry's T.S. 405; The Act of
the Hague of November 6, 1925, 74 L.N.T.S. 289; The Act of London of June 2, 1934, 1192
L.N.T.S. 17; The Act of Lisbon of October 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931, 828 U.N.T.S.
107; and the Act of Stockholm of July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. For a history of these various texts, see 1 S. LADAS, supra note
4, §§ 44-62. The Secretariat for the Paris Convention was the International Bureau for the Paris
Convention. This Bureau was united with the Berne Copyright Convention of 1886, 168 Parry's
T.S. 185, under the name Bureaux Internationaux Rdunis pour la Protection de la PropridtdIntellectuelle (BIRPI), under the supervision of the Swiss government. See 1 S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 61.
In 1970, the Secretariat for these two conventions, as well as others in the intellectual property field,
becamc the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), created under the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828
U.N.T.S. 3, signed in Stockholm on July 14, 1967. This Convention came into effect on April 26,
1970. 1974 U.N.Y.B. 103242, U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.1. On December 17, 1974, WIPO became a
specialized agency of the United Nations, under G.A. Res. 3346, 29(1) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31)
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). See also 1974 U.N.Y.B. 715-17, U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.I.
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the recommendations. 2 1

II.

A

COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE PATENT SYSTEMS IN
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The patent system still appears to follow the basic assumptions intuitively applied for the last 500 years-that a state benefits from new inventions, that an incentive should be offered for the creation of
inventions and that exclusivity is the best incentive. 22 Throughout this
history there has been a continuous tension and an ever-shifting balance
between the public interest in having access to the benefits of inventions
and the private interests of patent owners in fully exploiting the exclusive
rights afforded them. Despite the 500-year history of the patent system,
it is still extremely difficult to ascertain whether a patent system actually
results in a net social benefit to a developed country.2 3 Nonetheless, the
various costs and benefits associated with the patent system have been
studied. 24 A synthesis of the cost/benefit analysis is presented here.
There are two basic assumptions made in evaluating the benefits of a
patent system. 2 5 The first assumption is that society needs more inven-

tions than would be made if society did not offer incentives. The second
assumption is that the best incentive for these needed inventions is the
exclusivity provided by a patent system. If these assumptions are ac-

cepted (and there is no unanimity on this point 26), then what social benefits may be attributed to a patent system functioning under such

assumptions?
21. See infra notes 147-97 and accompanying text.
22. Mandich, supra note 1, at 176-77.
23. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE

AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

443-54 (2d ed. 1980) (illustrating difficulties of weighing costs and benefits of a patent system);

Machlup, supra note 2, at 80 (quoted infra in text accompanying note 52); Silverstein, Sharing
UnitedStates Energy Technology with Less-Developed Countries. A Modelfor InternationalTechnology Transfer, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 363, 369 (1978) (discussing lack of objective standards for
gauging the patent system on the level of inventive activity).
24. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 23, at 442-54; Dale & Huntoon, supra note 4, at 356-83;

Machlup, supra note 2, at 56-66; Peckham, supra note 2, at 391-400; Turner, supra note 2, at 453-55.
25. Professor Turner succinctly expresses these as follows:

The basic rationale of the patent system can be simply put. The economic case rests upon
two propositions: first, that we should have more invention and innovation than our economic system would provide in the absence of special inducement; and second, that the
granting of a statutory monopoly to inventors for a period of years is the best method of
providing such special inducement.
Turner, supra note 2, at 450-51.
26. See, e.g., id. at 451 ("none of these propositions is entirely free from doubt"); see also F.
SCHERER, supra note 23, at 447 ("We find then that business firms may invest in innovation without
patent protection if natural imitation lags are substantial, if there are major competitive differentiation advantages from being first in the market with a new product, and/or if the relevant market is
oligopolistic.").
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If any net benefit is to be attributed to a patent system, attention
must be directed only to those inventions that would not have been made
but for that patent system.2 7 We must examine those patent-induced inventions that would not have seen the light of day without the existence
of a patent system for their protection. There are, no doubt, a significant
number of inventions that would fall into the patent-induced category.
For example, those inventions effecting a genuine revolution in production or consumption patterns are thought to be patent induced. 2 8 Such
"revolutionary" inventions typically require large investment and entail a
high risk of failure. This is due to the unexploited nature of the technology involved and the absence of a developed market for such inventions,
29
even if successfully made.
On the other hand, it is equally evident that there are a significant
number of inventions that would be made irrespective of the availability
of patent protection. The aphorism that "necessity is the mother of invention" 30 undoubtedly reflects reality. In addition, there are inherent
incentives provided to the inventor outside of any patent system, such as
the potential for secrecy, the competitive advantage of being first on the
market, and the possibility of developing source recognition of the product (product differentiation). 31 These nonpatent incentives may well provide adequate inducement for many types of inventions, which may be
categorized as nonpatent-induced inventions.
Even the concept that a patent incentive is required for revolutionary inventions may be undercut somewhat by what John Barton calls the
"learning curve phenomenon."' 32 This phenomenon has particular application in high technology areas, where one would expect revolutionary
inventions to be created. According to Barton, as a consequence of this
phenomenon "[tihe [high tech] industry that first begins working down
this learning curve has a continuing cost advantage over later competitors," which "suggests that being there first provides an economic protec27. As stated by Dean Prosser, "An act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if

the particular event would have occurred without it." W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984). Hence, a patent statute
could not be considered a cause of an invention (an event) if the invention would have been invented
without such a patent statute.
28. F. SCHERER, supra note 23, at 448.
29. Id.
30. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 134 (15th ed. 1980) (Anonymous: Latin-mater
artium necessitas). But cf id. at 817 (Agatha Christie: "I don't think necessity is the mother of
invention-invention, in my opinion, arises directly from idleness, possibly also from laziness. To
save oneself trouble.").
31. See F. SCHERER, supra note 23, at 443-50.
32. See Barton, Technology Trade, 1985 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 77TH ANN. MEETING 130,
132 (1983 Proceedings) [hereinafter Barton 1983].
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tion that is the equivalent of patent protection. '33
The point is that many inventions, perhaps even an adequate
number of inventions for society, would be made with a "persuasion
cost ' 34 significantly less than that extracted by the exclusivity of a patent. This does not, however, diminish the potentially significant benefit
to society of those inventions that would not be created except for a patent system. Indeed, Frederic Scherer concludes that if patent protection
could be limited to patent-induced inventions, although there still might
be social costs to protecting inventions because of monopolistic pricing,
society would gain "at the very least from the resources that cost-saving
innovations [would] release for alternative uses, less the research and development cost of achieving that saving."' 35 His overall conclusion is
that:
[E]xcept when innovators' profits come largely from cannibalization of
the profits that would otherwise be enjoyed by the producers of substitute products, it is likely that society as a whole (i.e., including both
consumers and producers) gains from inventions3 6and innovations induced or hastened by the grant of patent rights.
The cost/benefit analysis of a patent system is complicated, however, by the fact that a system protects all inventions satisfying the requirements of the applicable patent statute. Patent statutes do not
distinguish, and appear incapable of distinguishing, those inventions that
are patent induced from those that are nonpatent induced. Thus, the
social benefits and costs of a patent system must be evaluated on the basis
37
of protecting all inventions, not just those that are patent induced.
33. Id. at 132, 136.
34. See Breyer, supra note 2, at 286-313 (In the context of book publishing, production of
books would not fall significantly so long as the publisher is assured of operating profitably.).
35. F. SCHERER, supra note 23, at 442.
36. Id. at 443 (emphasis added); Greer, supra note 4, at 224 ("Nevertheless, it can be formally
demonstrated that the economic benefits of such inventions (in the form of production cost savings
or new product consumption utilities) always exceed those social costs to yield a net social benefit.");
see also Kahn, The Role of Patents, in COMPETITION CARTELS AND THEIR REGULATION 308, 311

(J. Miller ed. 1962) ("So long as the innovation would not have been forthcoming without the patent,
this social cost must always be less than the benefit; but of course the converse is equally true.").
37. Some rudimentary techniques have been suggested for separating patent-induced from nonpatent-induced inventions. These include making the assumption that the patent system is more
important to private inventors and small firms than to large industrial firms, so patents granted to
the first category are presumed to be patent-induced inventions. Greer, supra note 4, at 225. Another technique would be to assign "basic" or "fundamental" inventions which provide major technological innovation to the patent-induced category, while those of a detail or improvement type
would be in the nonpatent-induced category. Id. at 225-26. It is interesting to note that a number of
studies have indicated that only the pharmaceutical industry appears to rely heavily upon the patent
system. See C. TAYLOR & Z. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 33239 (1973); Peckham, supra note 2, at 403-04.
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Turning then to the question of the net cost of a patent system that
protects all inventions meeting the statutory qualifications, Donald Turner identifies seven cost elements that may be attributable to such a system. 38 The first is the administrative cost of having a patent system.
These costs include separating potentially patentable inventions from
nonpatentable ones, procuring patents, evaluating whether there is infringement by others, enforcing the patents, and conversely-with respect to patents owned by others-the cost of evaluating whether there is
infringement, and defending against enforcement claims.3 9 Moreover,
the governmental patent-granting agency itself is likely to result in a net
4°
cost to society, although user fees may ameliorate this somewhat.
The second cost element is the underutilization of inventions that
41
are protected but would have been produced without a patent system.
What could have been obtained for free must now be paid for in the form
of the price demanded by patent owners who are the sole source of patented inventions. Even if licensed to others, the royalty-enhanced price
must be paid.
The third cost element is the abuse of the patent monopoly, including antitrust violations and patent misuse. 42 These include price-restrictive licensing, tie-in sales, exclusive grant-backs, and patent pooling, as
43
well as other misuses.
The fourth cost element is the research expenditures that competitors will make trying to avoid patent rights owned by others. 44 It would
appear that "inventing around" rather than direct investment in solving
previously unsolved problems tends to waste research resources,
38. Turner, supra note 2, at 454-55.
39. Id. at 454.
40. In the United States, for example, "[R]evenues from fees will be available to the Commissioner of Patents [and Trademarks] to carry out, to the extent provided for in appropriation Acts,
the activities of the Patent and Trademark Office." 35 U.S.C. § 42(c) (1982). The Commissioner is
authorized to adjust the fees every three years in accordance with the Consumer Price Index. Id.
§ 41(f). Prior to increasing the fees in 1982, 25% of the actual costs of processing patent applications werc defrayed by the revenue. Under the increased fee schedule this would increase to 50% in
1996. See 24 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 584, at 175 (June 17, 1982) (statement of
Rep. McClory supporting increasing Fees). The appropriation for the Patent and Trademark Office
for 1983 was $76 million. Id. at 433. The appropriations for fiscal years 1986, 1987 and 1988 are,
respectively, $101.6, $110.4 and $111.9 million. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-607, § 1, 100
Stat. 3470, 3470.
41. Turner, supra note 2, at 454.
42. Id. at 455.
43. Other abuses include attempting to extend the patent monopoly by dilatory prosecution of
patent applications, filing closely related "improvement" patents, and extending royalty payments
beyond the term of the patent. For a discussion of these forms of patent abuse, as well as those
mentioned in the text, see generally W. BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 53-63; D. CHISUM, PATENTS
§ 19.04 (1987); L. SULLIVAN, ANTrrp.UsT §§ 116-191 (1977).
44. Turner, supra note 2, at 455.
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although there may be some "fallout" effect by improving on the original
45
patent solution.
A fifth cost element arises when companies invest resources to secure patents in a given product area to preclude competitors from marketing those inventions, while having no intent to market or use such
inventions themselves. 46 These "blocking patents" make it more difficult
for competitors to market within this blocked product area, thereby denying consumers access to competing products.
A sixth cost of a patent system is that it may inhibit inventive activity.4 7 There is little incentive for companies to invest in developing products in an area heavily covered by the patents of competitors. Even if
research activities were directed to this area, the cost of providing a non48
infringing solution would, in all likelihood, be higher.
The final cost element of a patent system is the apparent over-alloca49
tion of resources to applied research as compared to basic research.
Because it is more likely that inventions will be made in developing products or methods that have immediate industrial application, investors
may forego allocation of resources for basic research in order to win the
50
"lottery" for a competition-protected invention.
These cost elements raise serious doubts about whether a patent system produces a net benefit for a society. Unfortunately, the inherent difficulties in evaluating a patent system's impact on a developed country's
economy make it nearly impossible to cast a definitive judgment about
the worth of a patent system.5 1 Fritz Machlup, faced with the reality of
inadequate information, concluded his leading study in 1958 with a lessthan-awe-inspiring endorsement of the value of the patent system within
industrialized countries such as the United States:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a
long time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of our present knowl45. See F. SCHERER, supra note 23, at 446 ("[T]he pace of advance in petroleum cracking
technology was almost certainly accelerated by the vigorous efforts of~companies to invent around
rival processes."). Scherer considered Edmund Kitch's different view of the "inventing around"
problem as "little influenced by any concern for reality." Id. at 447 n.30. Kitch had been critical of
Scherer's earlier study, Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097 (1965), for its failure to take into account the "prospect
function" of patents. Kitch, supra note 2, at 286.
46. Turner, supra note 2, at 455.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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52
edge, to recommend abolishing it.

Subsequent studies of the patent system have not questioned the basic validity of Machlup's conclusion.5 3 In short, on the basis of the ex-

isting state of economic analysis, a less-than-overwhelming case has been
54
made for the existing patent system in developed countries.
III.

EXTRAPOLATION TO THE THIRD WORLD

After concluding that, in essence, the only responsible recommendation with respect to a patent system was to maintain the status quo,
Machlup was quick to confine this conclusion to countries such as the
United States. In a small and predominantly nonindustrial country, different factors might well suggest another conclusion." He probably had
in mind Edith Penrose's study, 56 published in 1951, which was highly

critical of the economic justification for developing countries to participate in the international patent system.
Whether Penrose's study (or anyone else's for that matter) has been
taken seriously by developing countries seems doubtful at best. In the
thirty-five years following Penrose's study, developing countries in in57
creasing numbers have become part of the international patent system.

One cannot attribute this to any lack of clarity on the part of Penrose,
who states in her final conclusions: "In view of the desirability of encouraging the development of these countries and the fact that foreign
patents tend more to restrict than to advance their industrial technique,
such countries should be exempt from any international patent
58
arrangement."
52. Machlup, supra note 2, at 80.
53. See supra note 2.
54. On the other hand, the importance of the patent system cannot be discounted if, indeed, it
may induce inventions-for example, a cure for a deadly disease-which would not otherwise be
created. As Alfred Kahn concluded:
In sum: government-financed and university research do not depend primarily on patents.
Nor does a great deal of private, commercial innovation, the results of which are often nonpatentable, or more profitably kcpt secret. But the fact that the patent incentive is unnecessary in the public sector of the economy does not demonstrate that it is likewise unnecessary in the private. And within the private sector, the fact that certain kinds of inventions
do not require the patent in no way proves that other kinds do not require it either. The
area in which the patent is effective is clearly far narrower than most defenders of the
system seem to say; but there is no basis for concluding it is unimportant.
Kahn, supra note 36, at 323 (footnote omitted).
55. See Machlup, supra note 2, at 80.
56. E. PENROSE, supra note 4.
57. Indeed, of the present 97 member countries, 53 countries have adhered to the Paris Convention since 1951, the publication date of Penrose's book. Of these, 49 are developing countries, including 2 socialist countries. See 25 INDUS. PROP. 6-8 (1986). Perhaps more signifleantly, 17 of
these developing countries have adhered since 1975. See id.
58. E. PENROSE, supra note 4, at 233.
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The question of why developing countries have disregarded the conclusions of economists who have advised against their participation in the
international patent system is addressed later in this article. Before that
question can be answered, however, the social benefits and costs of the
international patent system to developing countries must be analyzed in
the same framework as was utilized with regard to developed countries.
A. Basic Assumptions.
As with developed countries, the two fundamental assumptions applicable to developing countries are: (1) that more inventions are needed
in the country than would otherwise be provided without its patent system, and (2) that the grant of the patent is the most efficient way of
achieving this goal. 59 A priori, what developing countries need is development. This leads to a third fundamental assumption in the case of
developing countries: (3) that the grant of patents on inventions leads to
development. In contrast to a developed country, a developing country
may not need-at its present state-additional inventions that are new,
useful and nonobvious in a developed country's sense of these standards.
The developmental needs of many developing countries may be far more
basic: they may lack the capability of assimilating even the state-of-theart into their industrial base. 60 This assumption that patents must lead to
development may be inconsistent with the first two assumptions and warrants careful evaluation before it is endorsed.
If the third assumption is set aside for the moment and the first two
assumptions are collapsed into the proposition that a patent incentive
should be provided to induce the creation of needed inventions, attention
can be focused on the realities faced by most developing countries compared with those in developed countries. The first reality is that the overwhelming majority of patents granted by developing countries are
granted to foreigners. 61 In contrast, a significant number (although a
59. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
60. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN THE TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 5, U.N. Doc. E/3861/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No.
65.II.B.1 (1964) [hereinafter U.N. REPORT] ("[T]he role of patents is limited ... partly because

much of the technology required by these [developing] countries is not at that latest stage of technological advance which is covered by patents."); see also 3 S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 1032.
61. A study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
1974 reports: "An overwhelming majority (84 per cent) of the patents in developing countries is
owned by foreigners, mainly multinational corporations of five developed market-economy countries," namely: United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom and
France. U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNCTAD SECRETARIAT AND INT'L BUREAU OF THE WIPO, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 92, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19 (1974) [hereinafter UNCTAD
REPORT].
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majority in only a few countries) of patents granted in any given developed country are granted to nationals of that country. 62 The second reality is that very few inventions are made by nationals of developing
countries and, as a result, very few domestic or foreign patents are
63
granted to them.
B.

Costs of Rewarding Nonpatent-InducedInventions.

Faced with this gross imbalance in patent ownership, the fact that
all inventions meeting the requirement of the patent system are protected
acquires special importance to developing countries in any cost/benefit
analysis. The grant of patents on nonpatent-induced as well as patentinduced inventions, as previously discussed, significantly increases the
net social costs of a patent system. 64
In developed countries the ratio of patent-induced to total inventions is a small, but not insignificant addition to the benefit side of the
cost/benefit analysis. Presumably, a substantial proportion of those inventions that are induced are induced either solely by the domestic patent system or in combination with the patent systems of other developed
countries having significant markets for the inventions in question.
Extending such an inducing effect to developing countries is more
tenuous because the primary markets of the patent owners are in their
own and other developed countries. There are probably very few inventions made by foreign enterprises because of the existence of a patent
system in any particular developing country. 65 Indeed, it would be conjectural at best to conclude that there are significant numbers of additional inventions made because of the availability of patents in
62. For example, in 1984, the following countries granted patents to foreigners in the indicated
percentage: Japan (16%), United States (43%), Federal Republic of Germany (48%), France
(68%), United Kingdom (76%) and Switzerland (83%). See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY STATISTICS at 8-9, WIPO Doc. No. IP/STAT/1984/B
(Publication B) (1985).
63. The UNCTAD Report concludes:
The nationals of developing countries hold in their own countries no more than I per cent
of the world stock of patents, and in other countries, no more than about two thirds of I
per cent of foreign-owned patents. These countries have plainly been on the periphery of
the patent system.
UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, at 92 (footnote omitted). In 1984, the developing countries who
are party to the Paris Convention (see id. at annex I) granted approximately 90% of their patents to
foreigners, See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 62, at 8-9 (Bahrain,
Burundi, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Zambia granted

100% of their patents to foreigners.).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31 (discussion of patent-induced and nonpatent-induced inventions).
65. See E. PENROSE, supra note 4, at 113-14; Greer, supra note 4, at 227-28; Penrose, International Patenting and the Less-Developed Countries, 83 ECON. J. 768, 770 (1973).
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developing countries. A possible exception to this may be developing
countries with large populations or special needs. Such countries might
induce additional investment over that which would be expected if patent
protection were available only in the home country and other developed
countries. 66 Nonetheless, the ratio of patent-induced to total inventions
is likely to be significantly lower in developing countries, particularly in
those that have relatively small populations or those that are among the
lesser-developed countries of the Third World.
It would seem to follow that, in general, a developing country could
obtain any developmental benefit associated with a particular invention
without offering any patent incentive, because that benefit would be
available without such an incentive. The most cost-effective manner for a
developing country to obtain any benefits associated with an invention is,
of course, to be free of any restraints-patent or otherwise. An interesting example of the benefit to developing countries derived by not granting patents on a particular category of inventions was discussed in a
recent report from the Office of Technology Assessment. SmithKlineBeckman alleged that in Argentina it lost approximately one-half of the
market for its trademarked "Tagamet" ulcer-treating medication.
SmithKline attributed its loss to the Argentinian patent law that excluded pharmaceuticals from patent protection. A generic producer in
Argentina copied the unpatented compound and began to market it in
competition with "Tagamet." Overall, SmithKline claimed a "loss" of
$50 million in revenue because of the lack of patent protection on
67
pharmaceuticals in numerous developing countries.
The "Tagamet" compound is a classic example of a nonpatent-in68
duced invention, insofar as Argentina and other countries-developing
and developed 69 alike-that do not protect pharmaceuticals are concerned. SmithKline was well aware that these countries did not provide
66. For instance, enterprises in developed countries might be induced to invest in finding a cure
for malaria by the availability of patents in developing countries, particularly those with large populations suffering from malaria, even though that disease is not a significant domestic problem in
developed countries.
67. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN
AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 229-30 (1986).

68. The following developing countries do not protect pharmaceuticals: Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran,
Iraq, Kampuchea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Tangier Zone, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 2A J. BAXTER, supra note 3, app. 2; see also UNCTAD REPORT, supra
note 61, at 116 table 14.
69. The following developed countries do not protect pharmacueticals: Canada, Finland,
Greece, Monaco, Norway, USSR and Democratic Republic of Germany. 2A J. BAXTER, supra note
3, app. 2; see also UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, at 116 table 14.
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such protection and most certainly would not invest any additional resources in order to develop the "Tagamet" invention on the basis of being able to obtain patents in those countries. The $50 million in so-called
lost revenues presumably resulted in significant benefits to developing
countries not protecting pharmaceuticals, in the form of resource retention, development of local enterprises, and consumer savings. These benefits result when generic drugs may be copied (without the attendant
developmental costs) and then marketed in competition with the originator, not only by local manufacturers, but also by those in the international market. 70 Had Argentina and other countries granted patents on
the pharmaceutical "Tagamet," there is little doubt that the cost to consumers and the net social cost to the developing country would have been
in excess of those actually experienced.
In sum, a fundamental distinction appears to exist between patents
granted in developed countries and those granted in developing countries. In the former the cost/benefit analysis may ultimately work out: it
is likely that there are a significant number of inventions that the patent
system induces that would not otherwise be available and that would not
otherwise add to the net social benefit of those countries. This cannot be
said of developing countries. By protecting inventions-in particular foreign inventions that are not patent induced-developing countries signifi71
cantly add to the cost side of the cost/benefit analysis.
C. Additional Costs to Developing Countries of Granting
Patents to Foreigners.
In addition to the costs associated with overbalance of nonpatentinduced inventions protected by patents owned by foreigners in developing countries, a number of the cost elements outlined above72 may have
particular impact in developing countries. It would appear that the administrative costs of a patent system in a developing country may require
a significantly higher percentage of the net resources of the country. 73 In
addition, there may be an inefficient allocation of trained technical personnel, probably already in short supply in a developing country, for the
administration of a patent-granting agency.
70. See Vaitsos, supra note 4, at 85-86 (significantly higher prices found for pharmaceuticals
protected by patents in Colombia compared to other countries that provided no such patent protection); see also Greer, supra note 4, at 235-39 (discussing considerable social costs of granting monopolies over "nonpatent-dependent" technologies).
71. See Greer, supra note 4, at 239.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 38-50.
73. The fees charged for services rendered by the patent-granting agency may offset some of the
costs of operating that agency. This does not, however, account for all administrative costs, nor for
the misallocation of resources. See infra text accompanying note 75.
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Perhaps an even more significant cost imposed on a developing
country is the underutilization of nonpatent-induced inventions-at least
those that local enterprises have the capability of making. The grant of
the patent precludes domestic competition; thus, local enterprises cannot
sell the patented invention within their home country or compete in the
export market, even in countries where the patented invention is not protected. The underutilization cost is compounded by the patent owner's
control of the import market for the patent invention, which also precludes imports from countries where the invention may be legally produced. In short, as illustrated by the pharmaceutical industry analysis,
the cost to consumers within the developing country that grants the pat74
ent is high.
The grant of patents to foreign enterprises by developing countries
has, no doubt, contributed to the increased costs associated with patent
abuses. To avoid or minimize such abuses in patent and technology
transfer transactions, many developing countries have imposed regulations requiring the approval and registration of such agreements. 75 Such
systems, however, are administratively costly and may merely ameliorate
rather than resolve the problem of abuses, especially if there is a combination among competitors holding patents.
A final cost element that may have a more significant impact on
developing countries than on developed countries is the misallocation of
resources toward creating inventions that may be of little developmental
importance to developing countries. Inventions in developed countries
tend to be, by definition, the newest technology, whereas many developing countries have a pressing need to assimilate state-of-the-art technology. 7 6 Moreover, the developmental problems of a given developing
country may be peculiar to it. If patents are granted for a wide range of
statutory classes of invention, there is no particularized incentive to induce inventions needed by that country. The incentive, rather, is to obtain a patent in that country in order to control the market in those
goods that create the maximum profit to the foreign patent owner.
The other cost elements referred to above, relating to duplication
and inhibition of research and to blocking of patents, would not seem to
increase costs significantly in developing countries. An insignificant
quantity of competing research is being performed in developing coun74. See Vaitsos, supra note 4, at 85.
75. For a summary of the various approaches taken for the regulation of technology transfer,
see UNCTAD, SELECTED PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS IN NATIONAL LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND POL-

ICY GUIDELINES, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.12/Supp. I/Add. I. (1975).

76. See Greer, supra note 4, at 233 (developed-country inventions appeal to high-income consumers and tend to substitute capital for labor).
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tries by local enterprises or even by foreign companies within those countries. 77 Nonetheless, these types of misallocation of resources by the
patent-acquiring enterprises are likely to affect the competitive position
of a particular foreign enterprise and the price at which inventions will be
imported into developing countries.
In sum, if the quidpro quo for a developing country to grant a patent is the same as that for developed countries (namely, for inventions
which would not otherwise be available in that country) then developing
countries, it would seem, fare poorly in the social bargain. There is a
reasonable likelihood that the net social cost to a developing country that
grants patents would be in excess of the net social benefit, unless other
considerations for patents would justify their grant. Therefore, the next
question to be examined relates to the third assumption-whether the
availability of a patent system in a developing country, even though not
inducing a significant number of inventions for that country, may still
produce net beneficial results by offering an incentive for development.
D. Patents as an Incentive for Development.
A number of arguments can be advanced for the proposition that
the grant of patents by a developing country aids its development. It
may be argued that the grant of patents promotes the availability of inventions within the country. In addition, the grant of patents may promote development by increasing the amount of foreign investment in the
developing country, both by patent owners and others. The granting of
patents may also increase the transfer of technology that supports industrial development. This may include technology only marginally related
to the patented inventions.
Whether the existence of a patent system promotes the availability
of inventions at a lower cost within a developing country is questionable.
First, it must be remembered that these inventions are principally nonpatent induced and would have been made regardless of whether there
was a patent system in that developing country. Thus, it is likely that
consumers within the developing country would have been able to
purchase a patented invention on the open market. The invention is
likely to be supplied by the foreign patent owner itself, who is unlikely to
refuse to import the invention merely because of the absence of patent
77. A survey of 50 developed-country firms (U.S. and European) that were involved in the
industrial fields of chemicals, electrical products and pharmaceuticals and that had transferred technology to firms in Latin American countries, concluded that these firms made "almost no contribution to local R & D operation" in Latin America. Greer, supra note 4, at 234-35 (discussing THE
SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH UNIT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX, THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO LATIN AMERICA: SUMMARY 32 (Dep't of Scientific Affairs, O.A.S. 1972)).
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protection in the developing country of import, provided a profit can be
made by selling the invention there. In addition, the invention may be
available on the open market from alternate sources, such as licensed
producers of the patented invention or producers in countries where no
license is required because patent protection has not been granted on the
invention.
The question of whether the availability of a patent system within a
developing country promotes foreign investment that increases development is more difficult. All things being equal, it may be that a potential
foreign investor would elect to choose one particular developing country
over another because of the availability of a patent system within the
former. The investor could thus protect its investment in that country
and assure a useful competitive advantage by controlling the market in
the manufactured invention. On the other hand, considering the disparate economic and political conditions existing in developing countries in
the various parts of the world, this assumption appears to be a most unlikely basis for decisionmaking. There are, of course, a great many other
factors beyond the availability of a patent system that enter into a decision about whether to invest in a particular developing country. 7 8 A primary, if not controlling factor is the political stability of the country.
The availability of a strong patent system in South Africa, for example,
would hardly seem to induce much foreign investment there at the present time. Investment also would not be expected if the necessary materials and labor force are unavailable at competitive costs. Ultimately, the
foreign investor will make the determination based on whether a particular invention could be made efficiently and profitably within a given developing country. In addition, if exportation from that country is
contemplated, the foreign investor will also have to take into account the
79
international as well as the local market.
In the complex decisionmaking process of whether to invest in a
foreign country, the availability of patent protection seems unlikely to be
a determinative factor. Indeed, the absence of patent protection may
sometimes be a factor leading to foreign investment. For example, foreign investment in the manufacture of generic drugs could be induced in
those developing countries that, like Argentina, do not protect
pharmaceuticals. 80
78. See U. ANDERFELT, supra note 4, at 136-41; STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, 85 CONG., 1ST SESS., THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM
AND FOREIGN POLICY, STUDY No. 5, at 12, 16-17 (Comm. Print 1957) (Vernon auth.); Penrose,
supra note 65, at 774-75.
79. See Barton 1983, supra note 32, at 137.
80. On a more cynical note, one can only speculate how much of the "counterfeiting" going on
in developing countries is financed by developed country sources.
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The question of whether patents induce the transfer of technology to
developing countries is significant because such transfer is extremely important to their development. Indeed, it is generally agreed that the
purchase of technology by developing countries is as efficient a method of
acquiring needed technical information as is its independent development.8 1 It would be highly inefficient to reinvent and redevelop technology that may be readily purchased at a reasonable cost. The social value
of the technology to a developing country would appear to exceed significantly its acquisition costs.
But the question is really whether the grant of patents does induce
the increased transfer of technology. Two subsidiary questions are involved. First, does the developing country need additional technical information in order to work a particular invention in that country? In
theory, a patent, wherever granted, must teach those skilled in the art
how to use the invention. Because the vast majority of inventions sought
to be patented in developing countries originate in developed countries
where patents have been obtained, the technical information contained in
these patent documents is available to the developing country and would
be so available regardless of whether it grants patents. This technical
information could be of great value to enterprises within the developing
country. Indeed, patent documentation has been promoted as a valuable
source of technical information and has been made readily available to
developing countries at nominal costs. 82 'The generic manufacture of
"Tagamet" in Argentina was presumably made possible by public domain information, including especially the SmithKline-Beckman patents
granted and published in other countries. The problem, however, is that
depending on the level of industrial sophistication within the developing
country, the patent documentation originating in a developed country is
likely to be inadequate in many, if not most, instances to practice the
83
invention in the developing country.
81. See Teece, Technology Transfer by MultinationalFirms: The Resource Cost of Transferring
Technological Know-how, 87 ECON. J. 242, 242 (1977).
82. Approximately one million patent documents are published throughout the world each
year. WIPO provides, through participating industrial property offices, free-of-charge, state-of-theart searches upon the request of developing countries. Under this program, which began in 1975,
over 2,500 search requests have been undertaken. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GOVERNING BODIES OF WIPO AND THE UNIONS ADMINISTERED BY WIPO, at paras.
2344 & annex G, WIPO Doc. No. AB/XVI/18 (Sept. 23, 1985). For a description of WIPO, see
infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
83. See U.N. REPORT, supra note 60, at 5, 39. There is also the frequent complaint that patent
disclosures are often inadequate to practice the invention in a developed country. There is, of course,
a strong incentive to keep as much information away from competitors as possible. See Kahn, supra
note 36, at 317-18.

Vol. 1987:831]

INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM

Accordingly, only when (a) the patent-granting agency in a developing country insists that the necessary, additional information be provided
in all foreign applications and (b) such additional information is not
otherwise available in the public domain, can it be said that the patent
grant increases the net technical information available in that country.
There is no indication that such requirements are being imposed or that
the agencies of developing countries have even the capability of doing so.
Indeed, in the vast majority of cases the patent documentation filed in the
identical in content to that
developing country is likely to be a translation
84
filed in the developed country of origin.
This leads to a second question: Would that additional technical
information (not provided in the patent document itself) be made available if a patent system did not exist in the developing country? If the
possessor of this information were willing to transfer it to an enterprise
within the developing country at a lower cost than that associated with
the exclusivity of a patent in the developed country, then it would appear
to be a net benefit to the developing country. 85
The argument most commonly made is that a patent incentive is
needed to induce the transfer of technology because patent owners would
otherwise be unwilling to transfer their valuable technology in the form
of trade secrets due to the relative weakness of trade secret law in developing countries. 86 If a patent were granted, the argument runs, this
would serve as underlying protection should the trade secret technology
be disclosed. The patent granted on the invention thus acts, in a sense, as
a "security interest" for the underlying trade secret. This is purely a
bootstrap argument, however, because the only reason (presumably) that
additional technical information is needed is because the patent documentation itself does not disclose adequate information to enable those
skilled in that art in the developing country to make the invention.
Hence, in theory, the patent should be invalid for failure to provide an
enabling disclosure. On the other hand, the practical reality of needing
not only the documentation, but also technical assistance in assimilating
84. Indeed, Herbert Stumpf finds the translation into the language of the developing country to
be one of the major advantages to the grant of patents. Stumpf, Interests and Conflicts ofInterest in
Technology Transfer-The Role of Patents,9 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 309, 315
(1978).
85. See Greer, supra note 4, at 240-42.
86. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra note 4, at 1885-86; Silverstein, supra note 23, at 370; Stumpf,
supra note 84, at 316-17. It may also be argued that the patent owner in the developed country
would not be willing to transfer technology to an enterprise in a developing country where no patent
protection exists because this would create another competitor. Yet, if such were the case, would a
patent owner who can obtain a patent in a developing country be any more ready to transfer a patent
license along with the needed additional technology to a competitor within the developing country?
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the documentation cannot be underestimated. A more straightforward
solution than granting patents in the hope they will induce the transfer of
technology would be to make such transfer legally and economically attractive to the possessors of such technology.
Indeed, the granting of patents may actually retard the transfer of
technology. The foreign patent owner may have little incentive to transfer technical information related to the patented invention if the owner is
deriving significant profits from having an import monopoly on that invention. Moreover, even though sources other than the patent owner
may be willing to transfer adequate technical information into the country, domestic enterprises would be foolish to pay for such technology
because the patent owner could bar domestic production on the basis of
the patent. The existence of the patent therefore precludes competition
87
in technology available from third-party sources.
The fear of developing countries, of course, has been that needed
technology will not be transferred unless a patent is granted. Presumably, enterprises will decide either to license patents or to transfer technology on the basis of optimizing their profit. But as we have seen, the grant
of a patent on an invention by a developing country does not ensure that
the patent owner will transfer any technological information into the developing country beyond that contained in the patent document. The
patent owner is certainly under no legal obligation to do so. Indeed, as is
discussed in the next part of this article, the international patent system
places significant restrictions on the ability of developing countries to impose compulsory licenses, even under the patent itself.
Despite the economic analysis demonstrating the undesirability of
granting patents to foreigners, more and more developing countries have
enacted patent statutes and have become full-fledged members of the
Paris Union. 88 The apparent belief of developing countries that a patent
system will induce development is partly attributable to the ambiguous
stance taken by the United Nations on the issue.
The leading United Nations report-The Role of Patents in the
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, published in 1964concluded that "[t]here is reason to believe that in spite of license fees
and royalties the underdeveloped countries derive net benefits from the
transfer of the patented knowledge." 8 9 The underlying assumptions in
87. See Penrose, supra note 65, at 772.
88. See supra note 57; see also UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, annex I (listing date of first
patent statute and membership in Paris Union for developing countries as of 1974). Current membership of the Paris Union may be found in 26 INDUS. PROP. 6-8 (1987).
89. U.N. REPORT, supra note 60, para. 276 (emphasis added). The report goes on to indicate
the difficulty of drawing such cost/benefit conclusions in the absence of detailed studies, but also
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reaching this conclusion appear to be that developing countries would
not otherwise be able to work the patented invention without the technical assistance of the patentee, and that this so-called "patented knowledge" would not otherwise be available unless a patent monopoly were
granted on this particular invention. 90 These assumptions notwithstanding, the few available studies tend to show-that only a small percentage of
patents owned by foreigners are actually ever worked in the patent-granting developing country. 9 1
The ambiguity within the United Nations system has been further
perpetuated by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), generally considered to be the voice of developing
countries within the United Nations system on trade and development
issues. 92 For example, an UNCTAD report, published a decade after the
United Nations report, states:
Apart from the possible benefits through receipt of patent fees and
stimulus to foreign investment .... local production on the basis of

patents might generate four advantages for developing countries.
These advantages are the domestic value added from production, tax
revenue accruing to the government, the gains of "learning by doing,"
and the possibility that some of the local production might be exported
and thereby
earn foreign exchange which would not have been earned
93
otherwise.
Whether the availability of patents in developing countries has
much effect on stimulating foreign inventions and whether developing
countries should provide such an incentive, as discussed above, 94 is conjectural. The advantage of "domestic value added" should be equally
obtainable without patents. Moreover, the argument that granting patents could result in the exportation of local production is not valid beindicates that a serious cost burden "relates mainly to those cases where the patented technology is
not in fact transferred." Id.
90. The use of the terminology "patented knowledge" suggests some confusion as to the nature
of a patent. Inventions satisfying the requirements of a given patent statute may be patented;
"knowledge," as such, may not be. Evidently what the U.N. Report is trying to convey is that some
knowledge would be transferred by means of the patent documentation (i.e., the application and
supplemental material) and the invention itself, if imported.
91. See, e.g., UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, para. 360 (90-95% of foreign-owned patents in
developing countries are not used); Katz, supra note 4, at 67 (surveying 102 patents held in Argentina and reporting that only 15 were being used); Vaitsos, supra note 4, at 78 (Out of 3,513 patents
relating to the pharmaceutical, textile and chemical industries only 10 were actually worked in Colombia in 1970; in Peru, out of a sample of 4,872 patents granted between 1960-1970 in major
industrial areas only 54 were reported as exploited.).
92. On the role of UNCTAD on the United Nations system, see generally U.N. CONFERENCE
ON TRADE & DEV., THE HISTORY OF UNCTAD 1964-1984, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/OSG/286,

U.N. Sales No. E.85.II.D.6 (1985).
93. UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, para. 369.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
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cause the existence of patents held by the foreign enterprise or licensees
in other countries would preclude such exportation.
In 1970, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 95
was created. It entered into the United Nations system in December of
1974 as a specialized agency. 96 Its support of the international patent
system has been unambiguous. The predecessor of WIPO, the Interna97
tional Bureau of the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property,
had, since it came into effect in 1886, served as the Secretariat for the

Paris Convention. Since its creation, WIPO has been quite successful in
working toward achieving the goal of maximum participation of developing countries in the international patent system. 98 A significant number
of programs have been conducted for the education of developing countries in industrial property throughout the world. 99 In certain instances
the industrial property offices of developed countries and patent professionals from the private sector assist in this program.10 ° The clear
message provided to developing countries within the auspices of WIPO is
that participation in the international patent system will lead to develop-

ment, while nonparticipation will place them at some developmental risk.
In addition to the stance taken by the United Nations, other
noneconomic reasons may be advanced for the perpetuation and expansion of the international patent system among developing countries. In
addition to WIPO, developed countries, through official as well as unoffi-

cial channels, have been highly successful in advocating a propatent philosophy in many developing countries.10 1 In the absence of United
Nations leadership, there appears to have been little effort to present
95. See supra note 20. There are presently 116 states party to this Convention. See 26 INDUS.
PROP. 3-5 (1987).
96. See supra note 20 for the General Assembly Resolution achieving this.
97. See I S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 61.
98. Since its creation on April 26, 1970, 19 states have become members of the Paris Union; of
these, 18 are developing countries, including the People's Republic of China and Mongolia. See 26
INDUS. PROP. 6-8 (1987).
99. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES IN
1984 paras. 1-410, WIPO Doc. No. BIG/282 (Aug. 1985) (listing activities, including training in
industrial property, assistance in revision and modernization of laws, conducting seminars and workshops in industrial property, licensing, and access to patent information).
100. See, eg., id. paras. 247, 258.
101. See id. paras. 8, 11, 247, 275, 280, for a summary of the financial and personal support
provided by various developed countries. The "experts" who were assembled by WIPO for the
development of the WIPO Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions included a number of
representatives from industry in developed countries. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, I WIPO MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON INVENTIONS at 143-44,
WIPO Publication No. 840(E) (1979). It is also interesting to note that proposed legislation in the
United States would create a "United States Intellectual Property Training Institute" whose purpose
would be "to train individuals of developing nations in both management and technical skills regarding the protection of intellectual property." S. 490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 415(a), (c)(1) (1987).
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competing analyses of the value of the patent system to developing countries. 10 2 Also, of course, there may be an institutional bias of the industrial property offices within the various developing countries to.
perpetuate their existence. Or it may be as simplistic as concluding that
"Since nothing else is working, why not give the patent system a try?"
Indeed, the reason may be more symbolic than real, as illustrated some
time ago by Fritz Machlup, when he suggested that the prestige associated with being a part of the international patent system among emerging
nations may have led them-to their economic detriment-"to have the
10 3
honor of paying higher prices for imported products."
IV.

THE IMPACT OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
ON THE THIRD WORLD

The preceding discussion should make it clear that in the face of
overwhelming foreign ownership of patents, and the insignificant number
of inventions induced by a patent system, it is not necessarily in the best
interest of a developing country to adopt a patent system. The following
section examines the role of the statutory framework of the international
patent system, primarily as expressed in the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property. 104 Does the present structure promote
the interests of developing countries, or does it exacerbate the problems
The directing board of this Institute would include executives of corporations that need domestic
and foreign intellectual property protection. Id. § 415(b)(6).
102. There has been little critical comment on the international patent system in general for the
last decade that has not been supportive of the status quo or moderate revision. See, e.g., Haar,
Revision of the Paris Convention: A Realignment of Private and PublicInterests in the International
PatentSystem, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 77, 91-100 (1982); Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 4, at 664-70;
Note, The United StatesPosition on Revising the ParisConvention: Quid Pro Quo or Denunciation, 5
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 411, 424-32 (1982). Indeed, Kunz-Hallstein had the temerity to say: "To
paraphrase a well-known statement by Fritz Machlup in his important study on the economic foundations of patent law, it would be irresponsible, based on the current state of our knowledge, to
suggest any weakening of the internationalpatent system." Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 4, at 670
(emphasis added). Compare this to what Machlup actually said, supra text accompanying note 52.
Kunz-Hallstein also somehow converts Edith Penrose to the side of the status quo. Kunz-Hallstein,
supra note 4, at 666. Note, however, that Penrose was writing before the proposals for the Paris
Convention were made and concluded:
Since non-industrial countries have very few inventions worth patenting in developed
countries, they cannot expect reciprocal advantages from granting patents to foreigners on
inventions worked in those countries. Hence, the presumption is strong that the less-developed countries gain little or nothing, and may even lose, from granting patents on inventions developed, published, and primarily worked abroad.
Penrose, supra note 65, at 783.
103. Machlup, Patents, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 461,
471 (D. Sills ed. 1968). Jorge Katz suggests that developing countries may have political motives in
acceding to the Paris Convention to demonstrate economic stability and respect for property. Katz,
supra note 4, at 27-28.
104. Paris Convention, supra note 20; see 1 S.LADAS, supra note 4, § 61.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:831

discussed above? Four fundamental principles of the Paris Convention
are directly relevant to this inquiry: "national treatment,"' 10 5 the "right
of priority,"' 10 6 "independence of patents,"' 1 7 and import
monopolization.' 0 8
A.

National Treatment.

The principle of national treatment is embodied in article 2(1) of the
Paris Convention:
Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection
of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the
advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter
grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this Convention.' 0 9
The purpose of "national treatment" is to prevent a granting country from discriminating between nationals and foreign inventors by gnaranteeing that inventors from member states of the Paris Union will be
treated similarly to nationals of the granting state. As the statistics make
abundantly clear, however, inventors (in reality their employing enterprises) in developed countries make considerably more use of this right of
national treatment than do those in developing countries.10 The reasons
for this are obvious: most inventions are made in developed countries,
and inventors in developing countries have a great deal of difficulty in
competing with the level of invention in most developed countries. By
accepting the prescriptions of article 2, developing countries exchange
the very real right of granting national treatment to foreign enterprises
for the mostly theoretical right of receiving that treatment in developed
countries. In this regard, as Fritz Machlup cautions, foreign-owned patents "cannot be reasonably regarded as parts of the national wealth or as
sources of real national income." 1" But in contrast:
One may regard domestic holdings of foreign patents as claims to future royalties and profits earned abroad and, hence, as assets; of
course, foreign holdings of domestic patents establishing foreign rights
to future royalties and profits earned here, would then have to be
counted among the liabilities and, therefore, as deductions from na105. Paris Convention, supra note 20, arts. 2, 3.
106. Id. art. 4.
107. Id. art. 4"'.
108. Id. art. 5A.
109. Id. art. 2, para. (1). Paragraph (1) ends with the following provision:
"Consequently, the.yshall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against
any infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are complied with."
110. See supra note 61.
111. Machlup, supra note 2, at 54.
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tional wealth. 1 12

A large majority of all patents granted in developing countries are to
foreign enterprises. Because these grants are not counterbalanced by the
grants of foreign patents to developing-country enterprises, the balance
113
of wealth significantly favors developed countries.

National treatment may even disfavor larger developed countries,
such as the United States. The United States has urged, from time to
time, that the guiding principle of the international patent system should

be "reciprocity" rather than national treatment. National treatment may
place the United States at a reciprocal disadvantage because the United
States provides a broad base of patent protection and does not have a
system of compulsory licenses, whereas many other developed countries
protect a narrower range of inventions, and impose compulsory licenses
114
with subsequent high maintenance fees.
On the other hand, small industrially developed countries, such as
the Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, may obtain significant benefits from national treatment because their countries provide rather limited markets for countries such as the United States, while their ability to
obtain patents in the United States provides their enterprises with a significant exclusive market. Nonetheless, it is not apparent that even a
system of reciprocity would assist enterprises in developing countries be-

cause of the small number of inventions created there.
In addition to requiring national treatment, paragraph 2 of article 2
precludes a member of the Paris Union from imposing any requirement
112. Id. at 55.
113. In reference to a particular economic model of international technology transfer, David
Silverstein concludes: "This result implies that under a unitary system of proprietary protection as
presently established by the 'national treatment' provision of the Paris Convention, a country cannot
optimize its economic well-being by adjusting the level of proprietary protection it chooses to offer."
Silverstein, supra note 23, at 403.
114. The United States made a number of attempts to amend the principle of national treatment,
in particular at The Hague Convention in 1925. These efforts failed. See 1 S. LADAS, supra note 4,
§ 55; E. PENROSE, supra note 4, at 64-67. The extent to which the United States extended intellectual property protection to foreigners during its early history when it would be categorized, in present terms, as a developing nation is interesting. The first patent act was enacted in 1790. Act of
April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. It was not, however, until the 1836 enactment that protection was
extended to "any person," deleting any requirement of citizenship or residency. Act of July 4, 1836,
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. See D. CHISuM, 3 PATENTS § 10.03[3][a], at 10-33 to 10-34 (1987)
(outlining development of distinction between foreign and domestic activity for purposes of determining priority and patentability). The history of copyright protection in the United States reflects
protectionism almost into the twentieth century. The first copyright act was also enacted in 1790.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. Yet it was not until 1891 that copyright protection was
extended to foreign nations provided their countries extended copyright protection to United States
citizens on substantially the same basis. Chace Act, ch. 565, § 13, 26 Stat. 1106, 1110 (1891). The
Chace Act also marked the appearance of the "manufacturing" clause. See R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT 636-44 (4th ed. 1985).
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of domicile or establishment of the enterprise in order to qualify for national treatment.1 1 5 Without a requirement of at least minimal contacts
with the developing country for the grant of patent, there would seem to
be even less likelihood that, the grant of the patent in that developing
country will lead to development in the sense of encouraging local working, the transfer of technology, or foreign investment.1 16 Rather, this
provision would seem to promote the import monopoly of foreign firms.
B.

Right of Priority.

The second fundamental principle of the Paris Convention is the
right of priority, which is set forth in article 4, pt. A, para. (1):
Any person who has duly filed an application for a patent... in one of
the countries of the Union, or his successor in title, shall enjoy for the
purposes of filing in the other
countries a right of priority during the
17
periods hereinafter fixed.'
The right of priority is fixed at twelve months for patents and gives
an inventor a grace period of one year from the filing of the patent in one
of the Union countries to proceed with the filing in other countries." 8
Once the application for the patent is filed and the priority period begun,
an application may not be invalidated in another member country by
reason of another filing, the publication or exploitation of the invention,
or the placing on sale of the invention.1 9 In essence, upon the filing in
one country of the Union, that filing date becomes the effective filing date
in all the other countries of the Union.
There are several advantages of the right of priority to patentacquiring enterprises: enterprises are not faced with the administrative
115. "However, no requirement as to domicile or establishment in the country where protection
is claimed may be imposed upon nationals of countries of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property rights." Paris Convention, supra note 17, art. 2, para. (2). Paragraph (3) authorizes
the member state, at least, to require "the designation of an address for service or the appointment of
an agent." Id. art. 2, para. (3).
116. As might be expected, enterprises in developed countries should be more favorably disposed
to transfer technology to subsidiaries and other related companies within a developing country. See

Grundmann, supra note 4, at 195.
117. The right of priority is also extended by this provision to utility models, industrial designs
and trademarks. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 1, para. (2).
118. Id. art. 4, pt. C, para. (1). The priority period for utility models is also set at 12 months,
while the period for industrial designs and trademarks is set at 6 months. Id.
119. See id. art. 4, pt. B, para (1), which provides:
Consequently, any subsequent filing in any of the other countries of the Union before the
expiration of the periods referred to above shall not be invalidated by reason of any acts
accomplished in the interval, in particular, another filing, the publication or exploitation of
the invention, the putting on sale of copies of the design, or the use of the mark, and such
acts cannot give rise to any third-party right or any right of personal possession. Rights
acquired by third parties before the date of the first application that serves as the basis for
the right of priority are reserved in accordance with the domestic legislation of each country of the Union.
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difficulty of filing at the same time in a multiplicity of countries before
statutory bars occur in the respective countries. 120 Moreover, the priority period enables the enterprise to evaluate the commercial importance
of an invention before committing resources to filing for patents in other
countries.1 2 1 Inventors in developing countries belonging to the Paris
Union would, of course, share in this benefit by filing an application in
any Union country, presumably their own. As with national treatment,
however, there is a great imbalance between the number of applications
claiming the right of priority filed by enterprises in developing countries
compared to those filed by enterprises in developed countries.
The practical result of the right of priority is to give developedcountry enterprises a grace period to evaluate whether it is commercially
desirable to file in a particular developing country. Prudent management
would suggest that filings would occur only in those developing countries
where the patent would bring economic rewards to the filing enterprise.
This further buttresses the argument that developed-country enterprises
are not induced to invent by the existence of patent systems in developing
countries; rather, they are provided with an after-the-fact incentive to file
in those countries when and only when it is to their economic advantage
to do so. Moreover, the priority period is granted upon the mere filing of
the application. The priority period must still be honored in the develop12 2
ing country "whatever may be the subsequent fate of the application"
in the original filing country, including abandonment of the application
or refusal of that country to grant the patent. In addition, the priority
period may not be taken into account in the term of the patent granted;
patents based upon the priority period must have the same term as pat123
ents granted to local inventors.

In sum, the right of priority provides enterprises of developed countries with a significant incentive to "wait and see" whether it is economically advantageous before filing in a developing country bound by the
Paris Convention. This incentive appears to belie the underlying assumption for the granting of patents-that the invention would not
otherwise be created but for the patent system.
120. The administrative difficulty, of course, was more severe prior to the advent of relatively
rapid modem communication facilities.
121. See 1 S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 255.
122. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 4, pt. A, para. (3) ("By a regular national filing is
meant any filing that is adequate to establish the date on which the application was filed in the
country concerned, whatever may be the subsequent fate of the application.").
123. Edith Penrose argues that a strong case may be made that the patent in the importing
country should expire at the same date as the corresponding patent in the exporting country. Penrose, supra note 65, at 776 n.1.
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C. Independence of Patents.

The third fundamental principle of the Paris Convention mandates
the legal independence of patents wherever granted. As stated in article

(1): "Patents applied for in the various countries of the Union by
nationals of countries of the Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether members of the
Union or not."124 The rationale for this provision is that each country
4 b15

grants its patents according to its own law and the validity of that patent

should depend upon an independent evaluation according to the law of
the granting state rather than being dependent upon the fate of the corre-

sponding patent in another country. This certainly has some appeal in
developed countries, which may have different standards for invention
and a significant number of competitors available to test the validity of
patents. When applied to developing countries, however, the appeal of
independence of patents is less cogent. For example, a patent may be
granted in a developed country and subsequently be invalidated on
grounds ranging from being obtained by fraud or barred by the patent
statute, to failing to meet the novelty, utility or inventiveness standards
applied in that developed country. A patent granted on the same invention in a developing country bound by the Paris Convention would be

entitled, under the principle of independence, to be treated as a valid
patent until otherwise declared invalid. 125 A serious question arises as to
the availability of knowledge in developing countries about the fate of
patents (even those invalidated on the ground of fraud).1 26 Moreover,

who is going to challenge that particular patent in the absence of local
124. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 4b"(1). Paragraph (1) is further explained in paragraph (2), which provides: "The foregoing provision is to be understood in an unrestricted sense, in
particular, in the sense that patents applied for during the period of priority are independent, both as
regards the grounds for nullity and forfeiture, and as regards their normal duration." Id. art. 4 ",
para. (2).
125. The invalidation in 1970 in the United States of the patent covering the drug ampicillin on
the ground of having been obtained by fraud illustrates the economic consequences of this. Corresponding patents on this drug had been obtained in more than 60 other countries. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, TRADE & DEVELOPMENT BOARD, COMMITTEE ON TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY, GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON THE ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUAL
PATENTS SYSTEM IN THE TRANFER OF TECHNOLOGY, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2 (1977) [hereinafter UNCTAD, PARIS REVISION].

126. Various proposals have been made for the exchange of information concerning the ultimate
fate of patent applications or patents in the various countries. See, e.g., Id., para. 72 ("[lIt is necessary for the [Paris] Convention to be amended to include the compulsory exchange of information
among member countries in respect of results of litigation on the validity of a patent."). Such exchange of information, however, would involve time delays as well as expense. Even with the receipt
of the information, article 4 " precludes the automatic invalidation of the patent, and any invalidation procedure would again impose delays and expense.
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competition? 127 The challenge may never come or it may be significantly
delayed to the economic detriment of the developing country, where monopoly prices may be extracted for the invention imported by the foreign
patent owner.
D. Import Monopolization.
The fourth fundamental principle of the Paris Convention is found
in article 5A, which limits the ability of member states to cause patent
holders to forfeit their patents and which also limits the granting of compulsory licenses. Paragraph (1) of article 5A precludes a member of the
Paris Union from causing the forfeiture of a patent on the basis that the
patented invention is imported into the country. 12 8 Paragraph (2) en-

ables members to grant compulsory licenses to prevent abuses, with failure to work given as an example of an abuse. 129 Paragraph (3) goes on to
preclude a member from causing the forfeiture of the patent unless the
grant of a compulsory license would not be sufficient to prevent the

abuse. Paragraph (3) would also bar forfeiture proceedings until the expiration of two years from the grant of the first compulsory license. 130 In
paragraph (4), time limitations are imposed on the member before a compulsory license may even be applied for on the grounds of failure to work
or insufficient working. These periods of time are four years from the
filing date of the patent application or three years from the grant date of
13 1
the patent, whichever period is longer.
127. The most likely challenges would come from the patent-granting agency or some other
public agency operating in the public interest. The patent statute or other laws of the developing
country would have to provide for such a procedure. The United States patent statute, for example,
requires the clerks of United States courts to notify the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks of
the filing of any patent action and their disposition, 35 U.S.C. § 290 (1982), but does not expressly
authorize the Patent and Trademark Office itself to seek invalidation in the public interest.
128. This paragraph provides:
The importation by the patentee into the country where the patent has been granted of
articles manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the
patent.
Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 5, pt. A, para. (1).
129. This paragraph provides:
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for
the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise
of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.
Id. art. 5, pt. A, para. (2).
130. This paragraph provides:
Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses. No proceedings
for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two
years from the grant of the first compulsory license.
Id art. 5, pt. A, para. (3).
131. This paragraph provides:
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One may seriously question whether a developing country obtains
an advantage from being bound by article 5A, which in essence grants
the foreign patent owner an import monopoly on the patented invention
for at least four years from the date of the filing of the application in that
country. In reality, the import monopoly may be five years because of
the one-year period of priority. The argument made in support of the
limitations of article 5A is that this delay period affords the patent owner
an opportunity to evaluate further whether commercial exploitation of
the invention within the granting country is desirable. 132 The question,
however, concerns for whom the limitations are desirable-the developing country or the patent owner. Obviously, a prudent patent owner will
only work an invention when and where it is economically desirable to
do so. The prudent patent owner will balance whether it is more profitable to exploit the import monopoly granted under the Paris Convention
or to initiate local working. The Paris Convention protects this option.
Nor should it be presumed that local working is always in the economic interest of the developing country and thus, if compulsory licenses
result in such working, that their grant is always desirable.13 3 This, of
course, may not be the case; economies of scale, the unavailability of raw
materials or parts, or unfavorable labor situations may make it more economical to import the patented invention than to produce it

domestically. 134
As illustrated by John Barton, "high-tech" economics favors exportation from developed countries to developing countries in two ways.
First, countries having a relatively large domestic market for certain
goods will tend to export those goods. 135 Second, the "learning curve
phenomenon" provides originators with a continuing cost advantage as
they work down the learning curve,13 6 especially under expanded exportmarket opportunities.
Unless it is more economical to produce the patented invention in
the country than to import it, the requirement for local working would
A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the
patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period
expires last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons.
Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the
form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which
exploits such license.
Id. at art. 5, pt. A, para. (4).
132. See 1 S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 322.
133. This is recognized in U.N. REPORT, supra note 60, paras. 116-20.
134. See Machlup, supra note 2, at 12. See generally E. PENROSE, supra note 4, at 137-61 (discussing compulsory working of foreign patents).
135. Barton 1983, supra note 32, at 132.
136. Id.
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137
act much the same as a protective tariff, increasing costs to consumers.
Local working certainly has emotional appeal as it tends to show that
economic development is progressing. Such economic nationalism, however, may not have positive developmental effects, unless the particular
market situation of that country affords comparative advantages for the
local working of the invention. 138 In addition, if the inventions are in
high-technology areas, the situation may be irreversible, as concluded by
Barton:
A far more sinister implication of the high-tech theories is that the
situation of the developing nations is much more desperate than it
would seem to be on the basis of the more traditional theories. Under
traditional theories, the developing nations would have a chance to
catch up if only other nations gave their exports a fair chance; under
the high-tech theory, their position of technological inferiority is almost irreversible. 139
In any event, even if a compulsory license is granted under a foreign-owned patent to a local enterprise, there is no assurance that the
invention can or will be efficiently worked. In addition, the local licensee, if capable of working the invention, will in all likelihood be faced
with competition from imports by the foreign patent owner who was
forced to grant the compulsory license. 14° Tariff restrictions may be
placed upon these imports but, again, the end result is to subsidize the
compulsory licensee, thereby raising local prices. Moreover, the compulsory licensee is given a license to practice the patented invention only in
that country. The licensor will be able to block exports by the licensee to
any countries where the licensor has obtained patents.
In an effort to preclude competition with the foreign patent owner,
developing countries, in the most recent negotiations for revision of the
Paris Convention, have proposed preferential treatment to enable developing countries to grant exclusive compulsory licenses- euphemistically
called "non-voluntary licenses."14 1 It has also been proposed that the
137. See Machlup, supra note 2, at 12.
138. Given "high-tech" economics, lesser developed countries may never have a comparative
advantage. See Barton 1983, supra note 32, at 133 ("These high-tech theories are in direct contradiction to more traditional economic theories. Free-trade logic would have industry distribution
reflect comparative advantage.").
139. Id.
140. It should be noted that any compulsory license granted in accordance with article 5, part A,
paragraph (4) must be a nonexclusive one, which would permit the patent owner (compulsory licensor) still to import the patented inventions as well as other licensees nnder the patent in that country.
Article 5, part A, paragraph (4) is reproduced supra note 131.

141. The various proposals may be found in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZAr
OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
TION, SYNOPTIC TABLES CONCERNING ARTICLES 1, 5A AND 5"'
FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 32-33 table 12, WIPO Doc. No. PR/DC/INF/
51 (1984). Although the text adopted as forwarded by the Preparatory Committee of the Diplomatic
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period of time before a compulsory license may be granted by a developing country for nonworking be shortened. 142 These solutions may have
nationalistic and political appeal, but they do not address the basic
problems associated with developing countries granting patents to for14 3
eigners in the first place.
The period of time that a developing country must delay before a
compulsory license may be granted does not seem to be very significant,
and indeed the developed countries seem to have conceded to the lessening of the restrictive periods.144 More central to the issue is a recognition
that compulsory licenses are notoriously under-used and inefficient in
operation, not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. 14 5 Ultimately, the decision of whether a patent will be worked in a
particular country will be decided by market conditions, thus minimizing
the effectiveness of the fear of a compulsory license as an inducement to
work locally. Indeed, even the compulsory licensee must pay royalties to
the patent owner, because the patent is not confiscated-it is merely licensed. A reasonable royalty would be due the patent owner, again most
likely rewarding the patent owner for an invention that was made independently of the patent system of that developing country. In sum,
whether a domestic competitor is granted an exclusive or a nonexclusive
license will not automatically make the licensee an efficient producer of
that particular invention in that particular country or in the international
market.
Aside from granting a compulsory license, if the patent owner
should fail to work the patent within the required time period, the developing country could, under its power of eminent domain, expropriate the
patent for the public good. 146 Nonetheless, this action imposes a cost on
Conference would permit exclusive nonvoluntary transfer in special cases for an undetermined period, the point has not yet been conceded. Id. at 32-33 table 12.
142. See id. at 36-37 table 14. The proposals range from two to three years from the grant.
143. Other proposals by developing countries are outlined in UNCTAD, PARIS REVISION, supra
note 125. See also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 141.
144. The developed countries have conceded the four years from filing alternative, if longer, and
would agree to three years from the grant. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
supra note 141, at 36-37 table 14.
145. See UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, para. 335; see also Henry, Multi-nationalPracticein
DeterminingProvisionsin Compulsory PatentLicenses, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 325 (1976) (surveying
use of contributory licenses in developed countries).
146. See U.N. REPORT, supra note 60, paras. 179-204 & annex D (summary of a number of
nations' provisions regarding expropriation of patents in the public interest; Synoptic Table of Major
Provisions of Patent Legislation in Selected Countries). Proposed paragraph (5) of article 5, part A
makes the expropriation power express. There appears to be substantial agreement between the
proposals of the developing countries and developed countries. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 141, at 30-31 table 11. But see Haar, supra note 102, at 95 ("Paragraph (5) of the draft is one of the most radical departures from present law."). In the United
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the society to compensate the patent owner because in the absence of the
patent the invention could have been imported at the most competitive
price on the international market, and produced within that country as
well as exported to those other countries where the invention was not
protected by patents.
To summarize, the principles of national treatment, right of priority,
independence of patents, and import monopolization impose significant
obligations and restraints upon the developing countries party to the
Paris Convention, arguably without providing them with corresponding
assurances that the grant of patents to foreigners will lead to increased
economic development. The playing field, already steeply sloped to the
disadvantage of developing countries because of their economic and developmental disparity, appears to be further tilted in the favor of developed countries by the legal regime embodying the fundamental principles
of the Paris Convention.
V.

REAPPRAISAL, RESTRUCTURING AND REPERCUSSIONS

Contrary to the advice freely offered to them by economists over the
past thirty years, developing countries continue to grant patents to foreigners within the colonial-era restrictions of the Paris Convention.
Rather than abolishing or abandoning the grant of patents to foreigners,
developing countries have elected to continue in the international patent
system as full, if unequal members with the evident hope that by working
within the system it may be improved to aid their developmental goals.
It should be noted that developing countries have achieved some success
in the regulation of the terms of transfer-of-technology licenses.147 Such
regulation, when undertaken, is accomplished by particular developing
countries themselves or by their regional groups; the regulation may thus
be fashioned in the perceived self-interest of the regulating country or
group. On the other hand, with respect to the international patent system, developing countries as a group have been ineffective in achieving
any meaningful amendment of the Paris Convention.1 48 Because of the
States, the theory underlying compensation by the government for the infringement of a patent is
that the infringement is a "taking" within the "eminent domain" power. See, e.g., Pitcairn v. United
States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1976); N. V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 316 F.2d 401, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
147. See Armstrong, Political Components and PracticalEffects of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1602 (1975).
148. The proposals made for the revision of the Paris Convention by UNCTAD, and introduced
by developing countries, largely have not been acceded to. Moreover, the proposals themselves providing limited preferential treatment for developing countries do not directly address the underlying
developed-country bias of the Paris Convention. See supra notes 104-46 and accompanying text. On
preferential treatment, see generally Dorsey, PreferentialTreatment: A New Standardfor Interna-
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consensus-voting rules on amending the Paris Convention, and the power
and intransigence of the developed countries on this matter, there is little
hope of meaningful amendment of the Paris Convention to the significant
advantage of developing countries within the auspices of WIPO. 149
Whatever the reasons for the continued adherence by developing
countries in ever-increasing numbers to the international patent system,
the time for reappraisal is ripe. Developing nations increasingly find
themselves burdened by horrendous debts owed to the developed
world, 150 faced with huge trade deficits, 151 and plagued by far less than
expected, let alone desirable, growth rates.1 52 This section offers some
suggestions for reappraisal and restructuring within the patent system
that may provide at least some short-term advantages to developing
countries.
A. Alternatives to the Developed Country Model.
1. Narrowed Scope of Protection Within the Paris Convention.
There are some alternative,; that may be explored short of withdrawal
from the international patent system and an absolute refusal to grant
patents to foreigners. Those developing countries that are members of
the Paris Union have full control over their patent laws and their implemention within the mandatory requirements of the Paris Convention.
Developing countries can remain full-fledged members of the Paris
Union without providing the same scope of patent protection that developed countries traditionally afford because there is no requirement in the
Paris Convention that all classes of inventions be protected; 153 the statutory classes of invention fall within the public policy of the individual
tional Economic Relations, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109 (1977); Note, supra note 102, at 411. The
Berne Convention, supra note 20 (Paris text of July 24, 1971), also administered by WIPO, provides
limited preferential treatment for developing countries. See The Berne Copyright Convention of
1886, 168 Parry's T.S. 185, app. arts. [-IV. With respect to the possibility of United States adherence to the Berne Convention, see infra note 192. Preferential treatment is also provided under the
Universal Copyright Convention, opened for signature September 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S.
No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 133, arts. Vbib,V- ', Vq"'', Appendix Declaration relating to art. XVII. The
United States has been a party since 1954.
149. Four diplomatic conferences on the revision of the Paris Convention have been held. The
difference in proposals made by various groups can be seen in WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION, supra note 141; article 5, part A is discussed id. at 22-47.
150. See Appendix.
151. Id. Note that even those countries which have a positive trade balance are often burdened
by the greatest foreign debts, e.g., Argentina and Brazil.
152. Id. See also supra note 16.
153. Article 1(3) provides:
Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall apply not only to
industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agriculture and extractive industries and to
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member states. All countries, developing as well as developed, exclude
certain classes of inventions from patent protection. 154 In particular,
many countries have specified that pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs are
not patentable subject matter. 155 The excluded classes could, of course,
be extended and patterned to meet the policy demands of a particular
developing country. It may not make economic sense in a particular developing country to grant patents (especially to foreign enterprises) on
luxury consumer inventions. On the other hand, the developmental
needs of that country may jusitify the grant of patents to inventions relating to a particular industry (e.g., mining technology because of the availability of a particular natural resource).
Another technique of patterning the patent statute to the needs of a
developing country would be to grant patents only for a relatively short
1 56
duration, rather than for the traditional periods exceeding ten years.
For instance, patents could be granted only for a term of three years.
The legislation could provide for renewal, if desired, for an additional
period, conditioned perhaps upon local working of the patent or proof of
1 57
net benefit to the developing country.
On a more radical plane, there is no explicit requirement in the Paris
Convention that a member state grant patents. Georg Hendrick Christian Bodenhausen, the first Director-General of WIPO, acknowledges
all manufactured or natural products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle,
minerals, mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.
Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 1, para. 3. This understanding, however, does not mandate
that all of these classes be protected; they are merely protectable, and such protection may be provided within the wisdom of the public policy of the legislating state.
154. For example, the United States limits the grant of patents to a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The Supreme Court discussed this section
in Diamond v. Diehr: "This Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery
is not embraced within the statutory terms. Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). The Court cited, inter
alia, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (Formula for computing and updating "alarm limit" in
catalytic conversions is unpatentable subject matter.); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
(algorithm unpatentable subject matter); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127
(1948) (product of nature unpatentable subject matter).
155. See, for example, UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, at 116 table 14, where it is indicated
that pharmaceuticals are denied protection in 46 countries. Of these, 37 are members of the Paris
Union. Foodstuffs are denied protection in 21 countries. Id. Of these, 15 are members of the Paris
Union.
156. See UNCTAD REPORT, supra note 61, at 120 table 15. The duration for which the patent
is granted bears upon the incentive provided to inventors and the costs that may arise for the monopoly period. Note, however, as Professor Goldstein concludes: "The judicial and legislative judgments produced-conceivably, for example, judgments that to reduce the duration of the patent or
copyright term by half would not diminish technological or artistic incentive one whit-would mark
a worthy return to first principles." Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59
CALIF. L. REv. 873, 904 (1971) (footnote omitted).
157. Significant renewal fees may be envisioned.
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that the Paris Convention does not require member states to protect all
titles of protection set forth in article 1(2).158 Bodenhausen, however,
refers to article 25, which obligates a member state "to adopt, in accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to insure the application of this Convention" 15 9 and also requires that at the time of
depositing an instrument of ratification a member state "be in a position
under its domestic law to give effect to the provisions of this Convention. ' 160 Bodenhausen concludes:
If a State adopts the Convention without providing, in its domestic
law, any type of protection for importantsubjects of industrialproperty,
such aspatents or trademarks,it will not be in a position to give effect
to substantial parts of the Convention dealing explicitly with the subjects, and will, therefore, probably be considered to
have implemented
16 1
the Convention insufficiently in its domestic law.
Although Bodenhausen's conclusion may seem to reflect the spirit of
the Paris Convention and indeed the interests of the Secretariat, there is
no express requirement that either patents or trademarks per se be protected by the member states. On the contrary, when the drafters of the
Convention desired mandatory protection under the Convention, they
1 62
clearly specified it. Industrial designs are a clear example.
158.

G. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE

PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 24 (1969). Article 1, paragraph (2) defines "industrial
property" as follows: "The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models,
industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of
origin, and the repression of unfair competition." Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 1, para. (2).
Bodenhausen carries this definition further:
However, this statement has not completely exhausted the question in view of other provisions in the Convention. Protection of several subjects of industrial property has been
expressly prescribed in the Convention, namely, industrial designs (article 5 quinquies),
service marks (article 6 sexies), collective marks (article 7 bis), trade names (articles 8, 9,
10 ter), indications of source (articles 10, 10 ter); and protection against unfair competition
(articles 10 bis and 10 ter) is also mandatory, as well as the temporary protection of certain
subjects exhibited at international exhibitions (article 1 I).Moreover, attention must be
directed to article 25 of the Convention ....
G. BODENHAUSEN, supra, at 24-25.
159. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 25, para. (1).
160. Id. art. 25, para. (2).
161. G. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 158, at 25.
162. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 5"u". See supra note 158 for a listing of other
mandatory provisions of the Paris Convention. The Convention provides for resolution of disputes
among member states over interpretation by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when negotiations fail or another method of settlement cannot be agreed upon. Paris Convention, supra note 20,
art. 28, para. (I). Paragraph (2) of article 28 permits a state to make a reservation to the jurisdiction
of the ICJ under paragraph (1)"at the time it signs this Act or deposits its instrument of ratification
or accession." Id. art. 28, para. (2). The Convention does not otherwise permit reservations to any
of its provisions, except as provided in article 28, paragraph (2) and article 20, paragraph (I), clause
(b), which would permit a member state of a version prior to the Stockholm text to declare that its
ratification or accession to the Stockholm text would not apply to articles I through 12 or 13
through 17. This would enable such a state to reject either the substantive articles (1-12) or the
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Indeed, it appears that Switzerland, in the early history of the Paris
Convention, took advantage of this "shortcoming" of not requiring
mandatory enactment of patent laws by member states. Switzerland was
one of the original signatories of the Paris Convention in 1883 and adhered to the Convention in 1884.163 Switzerland did not enact a patent
statute, however, until 1888164 Thus, until that time, Swiss domestic
inventors could obtain patents in other member states on the basis of
national treatment while foreign inventors could not obtain patents in
Switzerland. Even the original Swiss patent act of 1888 provided a limited scope of protection. It required that a "model" of the invention be
submitted in order for a patent to be granted, thus barring the grant of
inventions of processes. Under pressure from Germany, which itself was
pressured by its chemical industry, the Swiss patent law was amended in
165
1907 to drop the "model" requirement.
In any event, there is nothing in the Convention that precludes a
member state from limiting the scope of patent protection by protecting
only narrow classes of statutory subject matter, imposing high standards
of patentability, limiting the duration of patent grants, conditioning the
renewal of a patent on the economic interests of the developing country,
or imposing high filing and maintenance fees. While all of these techniques would make it more difficult for foreign enterprises to obtain patents in those countries, it would not preclude them from obtaining
patents. One would expect prudent enterprises to work within such a
revised system to optimize profits. With respect to inventors within the
developing country, on the basis of national treatment under the Paris
Convention, they would still have full access to the international patent
systems in all other member states, including the right of priority.
Some concern may be expressed for the diminished incentive to domestic inventors and enterprises that may result from narrowing the
scope of patent protection granted within a particular developing country. For example, if patents on a certain class of inventions were not
available, the result might be diminished investment in these particular
administrative articles (13-17) of the Stockholm text and be bound by those, respectively, of the
previous text to which the reserving state was a party. Id. art. 27, paras. (2)-(3).
163. The original signatories at the International Conference of 1883 in Paris were: Belgium,
Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, El Salvador, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland.
Acts of accession were filed by Great Britain and Ireland, Tunis and Ecuador prior to the effective
date of the Convention. The United States adhered on May 30, 1887. See I S. LADAS, supra note 4,
§§ 48-49.
164. E. PENROSE, supra note 4, at 123-24. It is also interesting to note that the Netherlands did
not have a patent statute at the time it adhered to the Convention. In 1869, it repealed its patent law
originally enacted in 1817 and did not reenact one until 1910. Id. at 15.
165. See id. at 120-24; see also Kronstein & Till, supra note 4, at 778-79, for further background
on the German-Swiss controversy.
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nonprotected classes. Nonetheless, the counterbalancing positive effect is
that resources may be redirected toward creating inventions that, as a
matter of public policy, have been identified as important to the industrial development of that particular country. Moreover, incentives other
than patents-such as governmental funding of research and development in particular technological areas, inventors' awards, prize competitions, and other forms of subsidization by the government-may also be
provided to domestic enterprises as well as foreign ones.
2. Abandonment of the Fiction of Novelty. It may be essential for
economic development that certain inventions be introduced and assimilated into the technological base of the country. To accommodate this, it
may be necessary to grant a monopoly on such essential inventions to
ensure their introduction. It should be emphasized, however, that the
mere granting of a patent on an invention does not ensure that the invention will or can be worked in that country. In a substantial number of
cases, technical information beyond that disclosed in the patent itself will
be required in order to enable a local enterprise to work the invention.
The realities of the international patent system must also be kept in
mind. First, the vast majority of inventions are made in developed countries and are patented there upon satisfying the novelty, utility and nonobviousness standards of those countries. Second, when such inventions
are patented in developing countries, they are entitled to the right of priority based upon the original applications filed in the developed country. 166 Such inventions may no longer be technically "novel" with
respect to any country bound to grant the right of priority. After the
original filing, the invention may safely go into the public domain by
disclosure, publication or sale. 167 In any event, novelty disappears when
the invention is published in a patent document anywhere in the world.
Indeed, by the time a developing country may grant a compulsory license
under the Paris Convention to work the invention in that country, the
invention has been in the public domain of the granting country itself for
at least three years. 1 68 Thus, the reality is that the subject matter of an
invention made in a developed country that otherwise would lack novelty
(i.e., the invention is defaczo not novel) is deemed to be "novel" under
the right of priority (i.e., it is de jure novel). Union countries must accede to this legal fiction and give it full effect under the Paris Convention.
166. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 4, pt. A. See supra notes 117-23 and.accompanying

text (discussing of right of priority).
167. Paris Convention, supra note 20, art. 4, pt. B.
168. A compulsory license cannot be granted before four years from the filing date or three years
from the grant of the patent in that country, whichever is the longer period. Id. art. 5, pt. A, para.

(4).
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Because of the need for additional technical information to work a
large number of inventions in developing countries and because such inventions lack de facto novelty, perhaps the grant of patents on such inventions ought to be conditioned upon a commitment by the patent
owner to provide the necessary cooperation to ensure the working of that
invention in the granting country. A number of proposals for the adoption by developing countries of specialized types of patents have surfaced
over the last twenty years with the goal of encouraging the introduction
of technology into these countries. These proposals find their historical
base in the so-called patents of "importation" or "confirmation," which
of countries, espehave been part of the patent legislation of a number
169
cially Latin American countries, for some time.
In general, an importation or confirmation patent covering the invention claimed in a foreign patent will be granted at any time during its
term, unless the invention has been introduced into the developing country prior to the application for such patent.1 70 In essence, such an arrangement merely extends the priority period until the invention is made
or sold in that country. For example, the United International Bureaux
for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) Model Law for Developing Countries of 1965 proposed a system that would require the
owner of such a patent to work the patent inside the country within two
years or forfeit the remainder of the ten-year import monopoly. 171 The
proposal would subject the owner of the patent or a licensee to penal
1 72
sanctions for importing the invention even during the two-year period.
Stephen Ladas would add "improved features" 173 to the BIRPI proposal,
169. See I S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 218. Ladas lists 24 countries offering such patents, including Spain, 14 Latin American countries, Barbados, Haiti, and Jamaica.
170. Id.
171. UNITED INTERNATIONAL BUREAUX FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON INVENTIONS annex A, § IV, para. (1)(d).

BIRPI Publication No. 801(E) (1965).
172. Id. annex A, § V. This section provides:
Direct or indirect importation by the owner of the patent of introduction or by a licensee
under such a patent of a product, the subject of the patent of introduction, or of a product
obtained directly by means of the process, the subject of the patent of introduction, shall
constitute an offence punishable according to Section 50. Importation of model or prototype products shall not constitute such an offence.
173. The improved features are:
(a) It should be available to the owner of a foreign patent provided he applies in the
developing country within five years from the grant of his foreign patent.
(b) If the foreign patentee fails to apply within the said period, then any other person may
so apply on the basis of an outstanding foreign patent.
(c) The first essential requirement for the grant of such patent should be that the subject
matter has not been manufactured in the developing country. Publication alone should not
be a bar.
(d) The application for such a patent should be published and be open to third-party
opposition.
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but would give the foreign patent owner five years to fie for the patent of
introduction; after that the invention would become "fair game," and
anyone could "apply on the basis of an outstanding foreign patent." 174
The latest proposal is the so-called "transfer of technology patent,"
which is contained in the annex to the WIPO Model Law on Inventions
for Developing Countries, promulgated in 1980.175 Although this proposed title of protection goes much further toward recognizing the needs
of developing countries for the transfer of technology and cooperation in
its assimilation, no country appears to have adopted it.
For the granting of a transfer-of-technology patent, the novelty requirements need not-indeed cannot-be met, because the grant is premised on the existence of a foreign patent.1 76 As a condition for the
grant of the transfer-of-technology patent, the foreign patent owner must
conclude a transfer-of-technology license1 77 with a domestic enterprise
that has, or proves that it "will have, an effective and serious industrial
establishment" within that country for the exploitation of that particular
invention. 178 The patent is granted jointly to the foreign and domestic
enterprise, 179 thus providing an incentive for the foreign enterprise to cooperate fully in achieving successful working of the invention by the parties jointly or by the domestic enterprise alone. 180 To further ensure
local working, joint importation will result in the lapse of the patent.18 1
A "temporary and limited exemption," however, may be granted by the
government if public interest so requires.1 8 2 Unauthorized importation
by one of the owners may be enjoined by the others. 183 A two-year
"start-up" period is afforded when "serious preparations" are shown to
be necessary for working. 184 Thereafter, insufficient working will result
(e) The second essential requirement should be that the invention covered by the Patent
of Introduction must be manufactured in the country within a period of two years from
grant. In the case of unjustified failure of such working, the patent would be forfeited.
(f) Until the invention was actually manufactured in the country, the Patent of Introduction would not prevent importation of the subject matter.
(g) The Patent of Introduction Should endure for the unexpired term of a foreign patent
with a minimum term of ten years.
1 S. LADAS, supra note 4, § 218.
174. Id.

175. 2

WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,

WIPO

MODEL LAW FOR DEVEL-

OPING COUNTRIES ON INVENTIONS §§ 601-616, at 82-102, WIPO Publication No. 841(E) (1980).

176. Id. § 603(1)(i).
177. Id. § 604(1)(a)(i).
178. Id. § 604(1)(a)(ii).

179.
180.
181.
182.
183,
184.

Id. § 604(I)(a).
Id. § 604(2)(i).
Id. § 618(2)(a).
Id. § 618(2)(b).
Id. § 618(3).
Id. § 609(2)(a), (b).
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in the ]apse of the patent. 185
The rationale underlying the grant of transfer-of-technology patents
appears to comport more with legal and economic realities faced by developing countries than does the granting of traditional patents to foreigners. If a developing country finds an invention so imperative to its
development that it is willing to provide its inventor with a monopoly,
that country would be well justified in sacrificing the legal requirement of
novelty under the right of priority for the assurance of receiving the
needed information and cooperation to practice the invention.
One of the shortcomings of a compulsory license is that it conveys
only a "naked" license to practice the patented invention; there is no
requirement that the patent owner transfer the needed information or
cooperate in the working of the invention by the licensee. The transferof-technology patent overcomes this problem by being granted only on
condition that sufficient information and cooperation are provided to ensure the working of the invention. Nonetheless, not all inventions can, of
course, be efficiently worked in every developing country, 18 6 nor do all
classes of inventions necessarily fall within the developmental needs of
the country.18 7 Only those inventions identified by the developing country as being critical for its development should be considered eligible for
the grant of a transfer-of-technology patent.
The transfer-of-technology patent may be an even better vehicle for
development if, in addition to a transfer-of-technology license, its grant is
conditioned on an arrangement for a license from the foreign owner to
the domestic enterprise under patents in other countries on the same invention. This license wonld enable the joint enterprise working the invention in the developing country to import the invention into the
licensed countries, as well as into countries where the invention is not
protected by patents. The ability of the joint enterprise to participate in
the export market for the invention may produce economies of scale and
badly needed foreign exchange.
B. PotentialRepercussions.
In deciding to eliminate or curtail patent protection to foreigners, a
developing country should take into account the probable reaction of developed countries and their enterprises. There is always the possibility, if
not the probability, that a developing country that eliminates or curtails
its patent protection to foreigners will experience a decrease in foreign
185. Id. § 609(2)(a), (b), (c).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 133-40.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 153-55.
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investment. Increased pressure no doubt will be brought to bear for reci-

procity of patent protection in countries not providing the full scope of
protection expected by developed countries and their enterprises. This

pressure is likely to be brought not merely by the enterprises themselves,
but also by the governments of developed countries. Indeed, such pres-

sure is already being applied. The United States, for example, has effectively applied diplomatic pressure on the governments of developing
countries to provide patent and other intellectual property protection acceptable to itself.18 8 This policy may be expected to continue.18 9 More-

over, the United States is now granting on only a reciprocal basis a socalled sui generis type of protection with regard to semiconductor chips.
Protection is granted to foreigners only if their respective countries afford

similar protection to United States firms.190 Under proposed federal legislation, trade sanctions could be imposed on countries that fail to provide adequate protection for intellectual property to United States

enterprises.191
One may argue that conditioning patent-like protection on reciprocal treatment runs contrary to the spirit of national treatment under the
Paris Convention, as well as other international intellectual property
conventions. 1 92 By unilaterally defining a particular title of protection as
"sui generis," and therefore outside the scope of the treaty obligations,

the United States has raised a significant question of its continued commitment to the principle of national treatment.
Balanced against the detriments of political pressure for reciprocity,
and perhaps some diminution in foreign investment and transfer of tech-

nology, is the assumed net benefit of the elimination of the import-patent
188. See supra note 13.
189. Professor Barton cautions industry against furtherance of such protectionist trade policies
in view of high-tech economic theory: "[Ilt would be far better if managers were able to expend their
resources on developing the technologies themselves than on the legal strategizing required by technological protectionism." Barton 1984, supra note 11, at 97.
190. See supra note 12.
191. See the discussion of The House Omnibus Trade Bill, supra note 10. This bill would make
it easier to keep out foreign competition on the basis of United States intellectual property rights
and, in essence, expects reciprocal treatment with respect to such rights by foreign countries. In a
similar protectionist fashion, the United States has removed preferential duty-free status on products
originating in certain developing countries, including Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan. See
Pine, US. Officials Curb Duty-Free Trade Status, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
192. For example, national treatment is required under both the Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 148, art. II (effective for United States since 1955) and the Berne Convention, supra
note 20, art. 3(1). On June 18, 1986, the Berne Convention was sent to the Senate by President
Reagan for its advice and consent. See 32 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 788, at 235
(July 17, 1986) (text of President's transmittal message). See also FinalReport of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 513 (1986) (discussing compatability between basic provisions of United States copyright law and Berne Copyright
Convention).

Vol. 1987:831]

INTERNATIONAL PA TENT SYSTEM

monopoly granted to foreign enterprises. If domestic production is possible, sales also may be expanded in the international market to countries
where patent protection is either not available or has not been obtained.
Illustrative of these benefits is the example of a local firm producing generic "Tagamet" for the Argentine market. 193 One would expect that
this firm would be able to export the generic "Tagamet" into those countries, particularly developing countries, that do not provide patent protection on pharmaceuticals, or where the "Tagamet" compound itself has
not been patented. This may assuage not only the pains, but also the
pocketbooks; any alleviation in the drain on the foreign exchange of developing countries for the importation of products can only further the
goals of domestic development.
In sum, a cautious and balanced approach is suggested for developing countries that participate in the international patent system. On the
one hand, they should pattern their domestic patent systems to achieve
primary domestic goals of industrialization. On the other hand, care
should be taken not to stray too far from traditional norms of protection,
as this may invoke retaliation on the part of developed countries and
194
their enterprises, which control needed resources.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Substantially all Third World countries, many since their emergence
from colonialism, have granted patents and are likely to continue to
grant patents predominately to foreign enterprises. If recent trends continue, with pressure being applied by developed countries and reinforced
by agencies and enterprises within those countries, developing countries
are likely to strengthen their patent systems and become, under stimulus
from WIPO, increasingly involved in the international patent system.195
The reasons for this continuing and increasing participation in the international patent system-in the face of strong economic and legal opinions to the contrary-range from formalized efforts toward development
193. See supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
194. Retaliation by developed countries is, of course, not without risk. Many developing countries have large foreign debts, and without positive international trade balances and a substantial
growth rate these countries may be unable to repay their foreign debts. As noted previously, Brazil
suspended interest payment on its foreign debt in February 1987. See supra note 16. Moreover,
without a surplus in trade or the ability to borrow to create a domestic industrial base, developing
countries will be unable to purchase goods produced by developed countries. For example, the
United States has seen its balance of trade with South American countries fall from a surplus of $3
billion in 1980 to a $10 billion deficit in 1985. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1987, at 792 (107th ed. 1986) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

195. Out of the 39 members of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 18 are developing countries and 6
are Eastern European countries. See 25 INDUS. PROP. 14 (1986).
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by inducing foreign investment and the transfer of technology to, perhaps, yearnings for prestige and self-respect.
Present economic conditions in the developed world, in particular
the United States, do not present a fertile environment for increased cooperation toward, and support for, Third World development. With
huge imbalances in international trade facing the United States, there
will be increasing pressure for protective trade measures. These measures will retard, rather than advance, free trade among nations. In addition, the balance-of-trade deficit of the United States has been
exacerbated by the developing countries' inability to purchase American
manufactured and agricultural products.196 Unless these countries have
the foreign-exchange capability to buy imported products, the existence
of imported monopolies under the international patent system is of diminished importance. The interdependence of the prosperity of the Old,
New and Third Worlds is well stated by the late Stephen Ladas, who was
one of the leading supporters of the international patent system:
Failure to extend the benefits of technology and science to large parts
of the world is not only morally wrong, but in the long run it denies to
the total system its ultimate fulfillment. Prosperity like peace is indivisible. The accelerated pace of the West's own economic progress
could be nullified by the failure of the rise in the standard of living of
the largest part of the world.197
Whatever impact the participation in the international patent system may have on individual developing countries, its cumulative effect in
the Third World may be significant. In this regard, individual developing countries either not participating or curtailing their participation
may be singled out for retaliatory measures. If, however, there is cooperation by developing countries in the formulation of a unified policy toward industrial property, collectively and individually the developing
countries should be in a better position to withstand retaliatory measures
and pressures exerted by developed countries. In addition to cooperating
among themselves, developing countries may urge responsible agencies
within the United Nations system to direct some attention to restructuring the international patent system in the interests of developing countries, along with continuing efforts to regulate the detrimental effects of
the present system.
196. For example, exports from Ihe United States to developing countries amounted to about
$60.2 billion in 1985, but imports to the United States from developing countries stood at $93.9
billion. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 194, at 837 table 1467.

197. Ladas, Existing Uniformity of IndustrialPropertyLaws and Revised Patent ofIntroduction:
Meansfor Transfer of Technical Information to Less IndustrializedCountries, 12 IDEA: THE PATENT TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. REs. & EDUC. 163, 163 (1968).
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Developing countries, many only in this century, have been freed
from the political chains of colonialism; nonetheless, in many instances,
economic chains of colonialism still remain. The international patent
system embodied in the Paris Convention is one of the links in these
chains. The beneficiaries of such a system are not unintentional. The
system expounds a late eighteenth century natural law property concept
of inventions, was designed to promote the interests of the industrialized
world at the end of the nineteenth century, and was amended to
strengthen those interests throughout the first part of the twentieth century. Now, in the late twentieth century, it continues to perpetuate those
interests by providing import monopolies in the form of patents granted
by developing countries to many of the former colonial powers.
There may be considerable trepidation in breaking or weakening this
link for fear of inhibiting development. Nonetheless, the quest for development is far too important for developing and developed countries alike
to ignore the economic and legal realities of the international patent system as we approach the twenty-first century.
APPENDIX
Country 19 8
Algeria
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Benin
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Camaroon
Cent. African Rep.
Chad
Congo
Cyprus
Egypt
Gabon
Ghana
Guinea
Haiti

Trade Balance1 9 9
4,223
3,982
-593
-259
13,086
-233
524
-25
-19
651
-703
-5,386
1,285
-36
-131

(84)
(84)
(84)
(82)

(84)
(84)

(84)

Debt2 0 0
17,501
28,671*
226
397
66,500*
393 (83)
587
2,444
325
208
1,855
926
19,925
1,084
1,471
1,572
677

Growth Rate20 1
-5.3
-4.4
3.0
.3
8.3
3.3
8.6
7.6
2.7
-2.7
-3.0
3.5
7.5
-2.0
7.6
1.3
1.8

(82)

(83)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(83)
(84)
(83)
(84)

198. The countries listed are those developing countries that are party to the Paris Convention.
All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, rounded to the nearest million.
199. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1986 FINANCIAL STATISTICS YEARBOOK.

Figures

are for 1985 unless otherwise indicated.
200. Figures marked with an * are drawn from The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country
Reports, No. 4 (1986). All other figures are from The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile
1986-1987. All debt figures are public debt, including undispersed debt with a maturity over one
year and publicly guaranteed private debt, except for Bahamas, Haiti and Zimbabwe; the figure for
Iraq is for unspecified external debt. All debt figures are for 1984 unless otherwise indicated.
201. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports, No. 4 (1986). Growth rates are in
percentages and for the year 1985 unless otherwise indicated.
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APPENDIX
Country

Trade Balance

Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jordan
Kenya
Korea (Republic)
Lebanon
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Sri Lanka
Surinam
Syria
Togo
Trinidad
Tunisia
Uganda
Tanzania
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

5,876
-2,412
1,482
-1,721
-302
-19
-125
28
-77
-228
-8
-27
12,799
-1,407
-69
4,353
-482
-55
-257
-657
48
-1,942
- 19
695
-1,111
-49
-350
191
-1,231
409
275
184

(84)
(84)

(83)
(83)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(82)
(84)
(84)

(84)

(84)
(81)
(81)
(84)
(84)
(83)
(84)

Debt
22,880*
8,216
16,140
5,200 (85)*
2,336*
3,877
24,642*
2,134
890 (83)
1,390
104*
1,636
527
69,007*
13,296
678*
16,936
11,174
453
2,284
3,638 (83)
24
2,453
787 (85)*
1,059
3,707*
3,186
2,545*
8,690*
4,525
3,504
2,150 (83)

Growth Rate
6.6
1.9
-2.5
3.0
-1.5
4.3
1.3
.9
3.1
4.6
2.7
4.3
-16.1
6.6
-4.0
4.0
-4.3
4.1
-3.0
2.1
1.3
-6.2
4.5
-5.5
2.6
.7
1.5
2.7
3.4
1.1

(84)

(83)

(84)
(84)
(84)
(84)

(84)
(84)
(82)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(83)
(84)
(84)
(84)
(84)

